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The Choice-of-Law Process in Product Liability

Actions
David E. Seidelson*
"Well, there you go again."'
Those opposed to interest analysis as a viable method of resolving
choice-of-law problems periodically and understandably express that
opposition. After awhile, those expressions seem to resemble a palimpsest, rewritten to meet particular kinds of cases. Now, it's product
liability actions. 2 Of course, that tends to stimulate those of us who
favor interest analysis to respond. Professor Russell J. Weintraub
has written a masterful response meeting the general criticisms of
interest analysis and demonstrating the general propriety of that
methodology. 3 Indeed, his work ultimately focuses on product liability
actions.
Then why the need for this article? Professor Weintraub fashioned
"the following rule for products liability cases:
(I) To determine whether plaintiff will be compensated and the extent
of compensation for actual damages:
(A) Apply the law of plaintiff's habitual residence if the product
that caused the harm or products of the same type are available
there through commercial channels and the defendant should
have foreseen this availability.
(B) If the law of plaintiff's habitual residence is not available
under rule (I)(A), the defendant may nevertheless choose that

Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. With appreciation and apologies to Ronald W. Reagan, fortieth President
of the United States.
2. See, e.g., Symposium on Interest Analysis In Conflict of Laws: An
Inquiry Into Fundamentals With a Side Glance at Products Liability, 46 Omo ST.
L.J. 457 (1985). Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without
Foundations, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 459; Juenger, What Now? 46 Omo ST. L.J. 509;
Evrigenis, Interest Analysis: A Continental Perspective, 46 OIo ST. L.J. 525;
*

Berman, To Brainerd Currie: A Fallen Giant, 46 OMo ST. L.J. 529.

3. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws and
the Use of that Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 493 (1985).
Professor Weintraub's article was incorporated in part into R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 349 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Weintraub with
page references to the article appearing in the Oio STATE LAW JOURNAL].
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law.
(C) If the law of plaintiff's habitual residence is not applied
under rules (I)(A) or (I)(B), the plaintiff may elect the law of
any of the following places:
(1) the defendant's principal place of business;
(2) the place where the product was acquired if the defendant should have foreseen its availability there through
commercial channels;
(3) the place where the defendant manufactured, designed,
or maintained the product or any of its component parts.
(II) On issues affecting the availability and measurement of punitive
damages, the plaintiff may elect the law of any of the places designated
4
in rule (I)(C).
I consider myself a long-time admirer of Professor Weintraub's
work. He has justifiably achieved a place among this country's most
eminent conflicts scholars. Moreover, when not fully satisfied with
existing methodology, Professor Weintraub has attempted to fashion
an improved technique. That is the highest level of scholarship. Still,
I have experienced difficulty accepting his three earlier rules for
resolving all choice-of-law problems in tort actions,' and now I find
it difficult to accept his rule for resolving all choice-of-law problems
in product liability actions. So, here I go again.
First, I should indicate the very significant areas in which I concur
in Professor Weintraub's views. I agree that determining the reasons
underlying a particular local law is not an impossible or even impractical task.6 I agree that determining the "territorial reach" of
those underlying reasons is capable of rational decision.7 Indeed, I
am inclined toward the view that most local laws were fashioned
(judicially or legislatively) primarily with an eye toward domestic
application. If State A has a "plaintiff-favoring"8 law, that law was
probably intended to apply to the litigation advantage of State A
plaintiffs, even to the litigation disadvantage of State A defendants.
If State B has a "defendant-favoring" law, that law was probably

4. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
5. R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 359 (3d. 1986)
[hereinafter Commentary]; Seidelson, Interest Analysis: The Quest for Perfection
and the Frailtiesof Man, 19 DUQ. L. REv. 207 (1981) [hereinafter Quest].
6. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 494.
7. Id. at 495.
8. I am indebted to Professor Weintraub for this easy short-hand characterization. See Commentary, supra note 5, § 6.32 at 359.
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intended to apply to the litigation advantage of State B defendants,
even at the cost of a litigation disadvantage to State B plaintiffs.
Consequently, if plaintiff is domiciled in State A, that state's plaintiff-favoring law might enjoy an a fortiori applicability (at least in
State A's view) where defendant is domiciled in some other state.
Similarly, if defendant is domiciled in State B, that state's defendantfavoring law might enjoy an a fortiori applicability (at least in State
B's view) where plaintiff is domiciled in some other state.
Generally, it is in those cases where each litigant is domiciled in a
state whose local law favors that litigant that true conflicts are most
likely to arise and where the forum state should exercise the greatest
restraint to assure that the apparent a fortiori applicability of its
local law does not obscure the apparent a fortiori applicability of
the other state's local law. It is in those cases that the forum should
consciously strive to put aside the parochial perspective that might
tilt the court toward "helping our own" at the undue expense of
"hurting the stranger." After all, that stranger is one of "our own"
when viewed from the perspective of the other interested state.
However, if State A has a plaintiff-favoring law and the defendant
is domiciled in State A, and State B has a defendant-favoring law
and the plaintiff is domiciled in State B, the forum state, using
interest analysis, should avoid a premature determination that both
states are disinterested. While neither state may have a significant
interest in the application of its own local law, each state may have
a minimal interest in the litigation (arising out of the litigant's being
domiciled in that state). This interest might best be served by application of the other state's local law. 9 Once the forum determines
that a state has no significant interest in the application of its own
local law, the court should feel free to inquire as to whether that
state has a minimal interest in the litigation and, if so, whether that
minimal interest would be best served by the other state's local law.' 0
As long as the determination of the existence of a minimal interest
in the litigation and how that minimal interest is best served is
deferred until the court concludes that the state has no significant
interest in the application of its own local law, there is no concern
that such an inquiry will generate a wholly spurious internal conflict."
Such an inquiry may reveal that the case does present a true conflict
at that lower level of interest.

9.
10.
11.

Quest, supra note 5, at 225.
Id. at 226.
Id.
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I agree with Professor Weintraub that the feared uncertainty of
result generated by interest analysis is exaggerated. Like Professor
Weintraub, I believe that the "famous series" of guest statute cases
decided by the New York Court of Appeals, and their apparent
inconsistencies, are explicable and avoidable. 12 1 agree with Professor
Weintraub that undue preference for forum law is identifiable and
avoidable.'" And like Professor Weintraub, I believe that the significance attached to domicile (even "at a time of great population
mobility") is justifiable and controllable. 14 In fact, it is in part because
of my feeling that interest analysis provides a rational methodology
for resolving choice-of-law problems that I find it difficult to accept
Professor Weintraub's rule for resolving choice-of-law problems in
product liability actions. If interest analysis is viable (and both
Professor Weintraub and I seem to agree that it is), why the need
for a single all-encompassing rule to resolve choice-of-law problems
in product liability actions?
Professor Weintraub wrote:
Even within a single jurisdiction, there are many complex rules relating
to products liability. Each suit is likely to be based on at least three
theories-negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty. If
the victim is a consumer, there are likely to be additional counts based
on special federal and state legislation intended to protect consumers.
Thus, different elements of the cause of action, different defenses,
and different doctrines of contributory and comparative fault are likely
to apply to each theory. This chaos is compounded exponentially when
the different rules of other jurisdictions are considered. The litigant's
ultimate nightmare is reached if there are multiple defendants and
hundreds of plaintiffs, all from different jurisdictions, as will occur
in the typical airplane crash or class action.'5
Professor Weintraub offers as an example of such a "nightmare"
the "Agent Orange" cases. Indeed, it is almost impossible to read
Chief Judge Weinstein's opinions in those cases without developing
a strong sense of sympathy and even empathy for a court confronted
with

12. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 496; Quest, supra note 5, at 214.
13. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 498.
14. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 501. Professor Weintraub and I would treat
a change of domicile effected after the operative facts but before the initiation of
litigation somewhat differently. Compare Commentary, supra note 5, at 345 with
Seidelson, Interest Analysis and an Enhanced Degree of Specificity: The Wrongful
Death Action, 10 DuQ. L. Riv. 525, 529 (1972).
15. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 503.
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[i]njuries arguably occurr[ing] in the fifty states and other nations
where the plaintiffs now live or at one time lived. The original exposure
to Agent Orange was at a variety of places in and near Vietnami.e., South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The conduct causing the
injury was the manufacture of Agent Orange by the defendants and
the alleged failure by the defendants to warn the government of the
dangers of Agent Orange. Agent Orange was manufactured in factories
in New Jersey, Michigan, Arkansas, West Virginia, Missouri and
Canada, and perhaps Germany and elsewhere. The basic decision to
use it was made in and around Washington, D.C. and in South
Vietnam by our government officials and those of South Vietnam.
The companies responsible for its manufacture are incorporated and
have as their main place of business the states of Delaware, New
Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, Kansas and Connecticut; treated as
a unit, their combined sales run into the billions of dollars and have
a substantial impact in every state of the union and in many foreign
countries. It is difficult to pinpoint any particular states as the location
of the failure to warn since what is alleged is inaction, not action.
However, the meetings and conferences which plaintiffs allege furthered what they refer to as the "conspiracy of silence" took place in
the various states where defendants have their principal places of
business. Other states with relevant contacts include Pennsylvania and
Texas where the Herbicide Management Team of the United States
armed forces was located, Alabama and Mississippi, the states from
where the Agent Orange was shipped, and South Vietnam, where it
was stored and used.
Adding to the factual complexity is that of mixture. The products
manufactured were so mixed and so labeled that it is not possible to
determine which manufacturer's product was used at any time or
place. 6
If all of that weren't enough, the court found itself presiding over
a class action which encompassed "[ilndividual claims originally filed
in all parts of the country [and] transferred for pretrial purposes to
this court.' ' 1 7 Judge Weinstein "assume[d],"18 quite correctly,19 that
16. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690,
700-01 (E.D. N.Y. 1984).
17. Id. at 692.
18. Id.at 695.
19. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). In Shutts, the
Court held that simply because a class action encompassing some 28,000 members
had been brought in a Kansas state court did not permit the Kansas court to apply
Kansas local law to all those within the class, irrespective of the various domiciles
of the class members and the locations of the natural gas wells involved in the case.
Rather, the Kansas court would be required to resolve each choice-of-law issue in
a manner that resulted in the application of the local law of a state having an
interest in the application of its law. Shutts makes two things clear: (1) certification
of a class alone does not empower the court to apply its own local law, and (2) the
due process and full faith and credit test of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302 (1981), may not be violated simply because resolution of the choice-of-law issues
may be difficult or time-consuming. 472 U.S. 797.
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"[w]here relevant state substantive and conflicts rules are not uni' 20
form, certification [of the class] does not ... provide uniformity.
Consequently, the court was not free to resolve all choice-of-law
problems by the application of the local or even the conflicts law of
the forum state. The district court's initial effort to finesse the
choice-of-law problems by finding a federal cause of action governed
22
by federal common law21 was rejected by the Second Circuit.
Subsequently, Judge Weinstein sought to resolve the conflicts problems by concluding that the courts of all interested states would
'2
apply "national consensus common law to all substantive issues."
Whether or not that (convenient) prediction or educated judicial
24
guess was correct may have been mooted by settlement of the cases.
Still, it's not difficult to imagine how inviting Professor Weintraub's
rule for resolving all choice-of-law problems in product liability cases
might be to a court confronted with the complex facts of the Agent
Orange cases. Before accepting that invitation, however, courts should
be mindful of a few of the considerations involved.
First, factual complexity may or may not generate choice-of-law
problems. It is entirely possible that, although two or more states
may be involved, the local laws of those states may be similar. Even
if their local laws differ, analysis may indicate that not all of those
states have an interest in the application of their respective disparate
laws. In either of these situations, what may have appeared to be a
conflicts "nightmare" could turn out to be just a sweet dream.
Second, should the choice-of-law problems turn out to be significant
and difficult, the court is not likely to be left entirely to its own
devices. Counsel on both sides, presumably desirous of achieving
those choice-of-law results which best serve their clients' causes, will
provide the court with substantial assistance. Consequently, before

20. 580 F. Supp. at 695.
21. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 737
(E.D. N.Y. 1979).

22. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom, Chapman v. Dow, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
23. 580 F. Supp. at 711. For a reaction to that method of resolving the
choice-of-law issues by one intimately involved in the litigation, see Twerski, With
Liberty and Justice For All: An Essay On Agent Orange and Choice of Law, 52
BRooILY

L. REv. 341 (1986).

24. For the judicial order approving settlement of the class actions, see In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D. N.Y. 1985).
With regard to those plaintiffs who opted out of the class, defendants' motion for
summary judgment was granted. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,
611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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adopting Professor Weintraub's rule for resolving all choice-of-law
problems in product liability cases, courts, with the aid of counsel,
should attempt to determine (1) the feasibility of resolving those
issues through interest analysis, (2) the extent to which the results
achieved through interest analysis might differ from those achieved
under Professor Weintraub's rule, and (3) which of those potentially
different results seem preferable. This article will attempt to do that
using a series of hypotheticals which illustrate several choice-of-law
problems that might arise in a product liability case. Specifically, we
shall examine choice-of-law questions that arise with regard to (1)
strict liability and comparative negligence, (2) strict liability and an
impleaded third-party defendant, (3) proof of negligence, (4) federal
preemption, (5) the duty to warn of "unknowable" risks, (6) market
share liability, (7) statute of limitations, (8) loss of consortium, and
(9) punitive damages.

I.

STRICT LIABILITY AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

Plaintiff brings a product liability action against the defendant
based on section 402A Restatement (Second) of Torts. 25 The defendant attempts to reduce the amount of damages recoverable by
alleging that plaintiff was contributorily negligent and by invoking a
comparative negligence statute. The plaintiff is domiciled in State A;
defendant is domiciled in State B. Both states have adopted 402A as
a part of their common law and both states have similar comparative
negligence statutes. State A, however, holds that its comparative
negligence statute is not applicable to 402A actions.2s Under State

25. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule in subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
See, e.g., Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., Inc., 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985)

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

26.

(construing Ohio comparative negligence statute); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534
F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (construing then existing Nebraska law); Kinard v. Coats
Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp.,
521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979).
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A's local law, the plaintiff, even if contributorily negligent, is entitled
to recover full damages from the 402A defendant. State A has
concluded that, since under comment n of section 402A27 contributory
negligence is not an available defense, the existence of a comparative
negligence statute does not resurrect that defense. State B, on the
other hand, permits the 402A defendant to utilize comparative negligence to reduce the amount of damages recoverable because such
an "equitable" distribution of the economic loss is desirable. 2 The
action is brought in State A. In response to defendant's allegation
of comparative negligence, plaintiff moves that the partial defense
should be stricken. How should the court rule on this motion?
If the court utilizes interest analysis, it will attempt to identify the
reasons underlying each state's local law. State A precludes the 402A
defendant from alleging comparative negligence for two reasons: (1)
to deter the sale of defective products by making the seller feel an
undiluted sting of liability, and (2) to assure that the injured victim
does not become an indigent ward of the state. The first reason,
aimed at conduct regulation, would seem to convert into a significant

27. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) provides:
n. Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this section deals is
not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied
to strict liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the
plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to
discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its
existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists
in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and
commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under
this section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers
the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably
to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
28. See, e.g. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42
(Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motor Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144
Cal. Rptr. 386 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976);
Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982); Sun Valley
Airlines v. Arco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Kennedy v.
City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980); Busch v. Busch Construction,
262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Edwards v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th
Cir. 1975) (applying Mississippi law); Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F.
Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981); Thibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395
A.2d 843 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406
A.2d 140 (1979); Lippes v. Atlantic Bank, 69 A.D.2d 127, 419 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1979);
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Mulherin v. IngersollRand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149
(3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture.,
297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967).
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interest on the part of State A if the conduct intended to be regulated
or the immediate consequences of that conduct occurred in State A,
or if the ongoing consequences of that conduct would be felt in State
A. 29 Even if the sale of the defective product occurred in State B,
State A would have an interest in the application of its local law if
the product injured the plaintiff in State A, because the injury would
be the immediate consequence of the sale of a defective product.
Similarly, even if the injury occurred in State B, State A would have
an interest in the application of its local law if the ongoing consequences of that injury would be felt in State A, as they would, given
plaintiff's domicile in that state.
Let's assume that sale and injury occurred in State B but the
ongoing consequences will be felt in State A, the plaintiff's domicile.
In those circumstances, the conduct regulating reason underlying
State A's local law would convert into a significant interest on the
part of State A in the application of its local law precluding the
402A defendant from invoking comparative negligence. Because
plaintiff is domiciled in State A, the second reason for that state's
law also would convert into a significant interest on the part of State
A in applying its local law; if plaintiff's damages are diminished
pursuant to the comparative negligence statute, the injured plaintiff
may become an indigent ward of State A. Consequently, both of the
reasons underlying State A's local law give that state significant
interests in having its law applied. State B's local law permitting the
402A defendant to diminish damages through the comparative negligence statute exists to assure a more equitable distribution of the
economic loss resulting from the use of a defective product. More
specifically, State B wants to protect the economic integrity of State
B domiciled sellers by limiting the damages imposed on such entities.
Defendant is domiciled in State B and falls precisely within the class

29. When one reason for a state's law is conduct regulation, I believe that
reason converts into a significant interest on the part of that state in the
. application of its law if: (1) the conduct occurred in that state; or (2) the
immediate consequences of that conduct occurred in that state; or (3) the
continuing consequences of that conduct will be felt in that state. Presumably,
a state's interest in regulating conduct rests on a desire to avoid the immediate
or continuing adverse consequences made possible by such conduct. Consequently, if the conduct occurs within the state, thereby generating its reasonably
foreseeable consequences within the state, or the immediate consequences
occur within the state, or the continuing consequences will be felt within the
state, the state's interest in conduct regulation converts into a significant
interest.
Quest, supra note 5, at 239.
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intended to be protected by that state's law; therefore, the reason

for State B's law converts into a significant interest on the part of
State B in having its local law applied.
Interest analysis indicates that this case presents a true conflict:
each state has a significant interest in the application of its own local
law. In those circumstances, the court, under Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Hague,30 would be constitutionally free to apply the local law of
either state. Neither result would violate the due process 3' rights of
the litigant adversely affected thereby and application of the forum's
2
law would not violate the full faith and credit clause.
Having arrived at that point through interest analysis, the court
would then attempt to determine which state's interest in the application of its own local law is more significant. I am inclined to think

that the court would find State A's interest in the application of its
law to be of greater significance than the admittedly legitimate interest

of State B in the application of its law, for two reasons: (1) State
A's conduct regulating reason is aimed at protecting and preserving
human life. Such a concern would seem, almost by definition, to be
of greater significance than State B's interest in protecting the economic integrity of State B sellers (2) State A's concern with assuring
that its domicilaries do not become indigent wards of the state would
seem to outweigh State B's concern with the economic integrity of
its domiciled seller. Given an adverse choice-of-law result, 33 the

30. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Hague makes it
clear that in order for a choice-of-law result to be constitutionally permissible it
must apply the local law of a state having a significant interest in the application
of its law. Should the court apply the local law of a state having no such interest,
that result would violate the due process rights of the litigant adversely affected; if
that local law were the forum's, that result would also violate the full faith and
credit clause. Id.
31. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides, in part:
"[n]or shall any State deprive any person of... property, without due process of
law ..... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution provides,
in part: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State...." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV,

§ 1.

33. Here, and throughout the article, I have utilized what I understand to
be the comparative impairment approach used by the Supreme Court of California.
See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d
721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546
P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Lettieri v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society, 627 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1980) (diversity court applying
comparative impairment). For critical reaction to the California court's use of
comparative impairment, see Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Better Law:
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indigence of the injured victim seems more likely to eventuate than
does the bankruptcy of the commercial seller. Therefore, I believe
that the court would find State A's interest in the application of its
local law to be the more intense interest and, for that reason, would
apply State A's local law and grant plaintiff's motion to strike.
But suppose the defendant, conceding that the due process and
full faith and credit tests of Hague are satisfied because of State A's
significant interest in the application of its local law, argues that the
application of State A's law comes as such an outrageous surprise
to defendant as to violate its due process rights.14 Defendant may

Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (1978); Kay, The
Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the
CaliforniaExperience, 68 CAzn. L. REv. 577 (1980). Under comparative impairment,
the court, confronted with a true conflict, seeks to determine which state's local
law would less impair the other state's interest and then applies that less impairing
law. To me, that approach is an inherent part of interest analysis since it is aimed
at determining which states's interest is the more intense.
34. To illustrate this "outrageous surprise" due process argument, let's
fashion a hypothetical case. Defendant liquor licensee in State A serves intoxicating
beverages to an already visibly intoxicated patron. Patron then travels 50 miles to
the nearest airport, flies 3000 miles to State B and there, because of his intoxication,
injures the plaintiff, a State B domiciliary. To recover for his injuries, plaintiff sues
defendant licensee. Plaintiff's theory of liability is State B's Dram Shop Act which
imposes civil liability on a licensee who serves a visibly intoxicated patron for injuries
occasioned by the patron. State A's local law imposes no such liability. State B's
Dram Shop Act would seem to have two underlying purposes: (1) to deter such
licensee conduct, and (2) to afford State B domiciliaries a financially responsible
defendant. Because the immediate consequences of the conduct (plaintiff's injuries)
occurred in State B and the ongoing consequences of that conduct will be felt in
State B (plaintiff's domicile), State B would have a significant interest in the
application of its local law based on the conduct regulating reason for its law.
Because the plaintiff is domiciled in State B, he would be within the class intended
to be afforded a financially responsible defendant, so the second reason for State
B's law would also convert. Yet, given the geography involved and the not reasonably
foreseeable intervening conduct of the patron, application of State B's law to the
litigation disadvantage of the State A defendant might well 'come as such an
outrageous surprise to the latter as to violate his due process rights.
I believe no such outrageous surprise exists in the hypothetical discussed in the
text, given the readily portable and stable nature of defendant's defective product
and the reasonably foreseeable act of any user in carrying the product from the
state of purchase to the user's state of domicile. Such intervening conduct seems
far more reasonably foreseeable than the transcontinental travel of an inebriated
bar patron.
For a case imposing liability on an out-of-state licensee for injuries resulting
from an illegal sale of beer, see Blamey v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980). In Blarney, the state in which the licensee's
conduct occurred (Wisconsin) and the state whose local law imposed liability
(Minnesota) are contiguous. See also Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313,
546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976) (Nevada licensee
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assert that it could never have contemplated the application of State
A's law because the product was sold to the plaintiff in State B and
is not offered for sale in State A. Assuming that the product was
readily portable, and the possibility that it could be carried from
State B to State A or to any other state was foreseeable, how should
the court react to defendant's "outrageous surprise" argument? I
think the argument would (and should) be rejected. Given the facts
hypothesized, the defendant could have contemplated application of
the local law of any state into which the product could have been
carried. Although the United States Supreme Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen3" held that, for jurisdictionalpurposes, the intervening
conduct of the ultimate consumer, no matter how foreseeable, could
not be imputed to the nonresident defendant, the Court has emphasized that the "contacts" necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction
by a particular state are different from those "contacts" which would
justify the application of that state's local law. 36 Even absent those
former contacts, other contacts and resulting interests may justify
the application of that state's law. I think that is the situation which
exists in our hypothetical. Interest analysis reveals State A's significant interest in applying its local law and the nature of the defendant's
product makes the application of that law constitutionally permissible. The portable nature of defendant's product, which makes the
application of the local law of State A or any other state contemplatable to defendant, justifies the application of State A's local law
even though we have assumed that the sale and injury occurred in
State B.
liable for injuries in California pursuant to California local law). Subsequently, the
California Legislature enacted a statute declaring that the consumption of alcoholic
beverages rather than the serving of such beverages was the proximate cause of the
injuries inflicted by the intoxicated person. Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 25602 (b) & (c)
(Deering 1978). However, the California Code also provides for liability of the
server who provides alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated minor. Id. at §
25602.1.
35. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
36. See, e.g., Shaffer V.Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977) (footnote omitted):
The interest appellee has identified may support the application of Delaware
law to resolve any controversy over appellants' actions in their capacities as
officers and directors. But we have rejected the argument that if a State's law
can properly be applied to a dispute, its courts necessarily have jurisdiction
over the parties to that dispute.
See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958):
It [the forum state] does not acquire that jurisdiction [over a nonresident
defendant] by being the "center of gravity" of the controversy, or the most
convenient location for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice
of law.
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How would Professor Weintraub's rule resolve the same choiceof-law problem? The first potentially applicable language would be:
To determine .

.

. the extent of compensation for actual damages[,]

[a]pply the law of plaintiff's habitual residence if the product that
caused the harm or products of the same type are available there
through commercial
channels and the defendant should have foreseen
37
this availability.
Let's assume that neither the injury-producing defective product nor
products of the same type are available in State A. Rather, the State
A plaintiff purchased the defective and novel product in State B and
either carried it back to State A and was injured there or, as we
have hypothesized, plaintiff purchased the product and was injured
in State B. In either of these circumstances, the above quoted
language of rule (I)(A) would be inapplicable. The next potentially
applicable language would be found in rule (I)(B):
If the law of plaintiff's habitual residence is not available under rule
38
(I)(A), the defendant may nevertheless choose that law.
Rather clearly, our defendant would have no interest in choosing
State A's local law under which the comparative negligence defense
would fail. So much for rule (I)(B). The next potentially applicable
language would be:
If the law of plaintiff's habitual residence is not applied under rules
(I)(A) or (I)(B), the plaintiff may elect the law of any of the following
places:
1. the defendant's principal place of business;
2. the place where the product was acquired if the defendant
should have foreseen its availability there through commercial
channels;
3. the place where the defendant manufactured, designed, or
maintained the product or any of its component parts. 39
Obviously, our plaintiff would have no interest in electing the law
of defendant's principal place of business, State B; it is that state's
local law which permits the comparative negligence defense. Similarly,
since our plaintiff acquired the defective product in State B, plaintiff
would have no interest in electing that law. Assuming that the
defendant manufactured, designed, and maintained the product or

37. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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any of its component parts in State B, the plaintiff would have no
interest in electing that law. It appears that the "mandatory" application of State A's local law under rule (I)(A) would be inapplicable
to our case because the conditions precedent to such application are
not satisfied. The "elective" application of State A's local law under
rule (I)(B) would be inapplicable to our case because defendant would
not want to elect the disserving law of State A. Similarly, the
"elective" application of State B's local law under rule (I)(C) would
be inapplicable to our case because plaintiff would not want to elect
the disserving law of State B.40 What's the court to do now?
I'm not sure. The only remaining portion of Professor Weintraub's
rule deals with "the availability and measurement of punitive damages." ' 4' Clearly, that language has no applicability to our hypothetical
case. However, we should not overlook the caveat to Professor
Weintraub's rule:
It should be remembered that this rule is only a presumption that is
likely to represent the results of proper interest. analysis and resolution
of conflicts by drawing on transjurisdictional policies and trends. If,
as may sometimes occur, both defendant's and plaintiff's states wish
under
plaintiff to have the advantage of the higher recovery available
42
defendant's law, then that is the law that should be applied.
Does the italicized portion of that caveat apply to our facts? I think
not. In our hypothetical, "defendant's law," the local law of State
B, does not provide "the higher recovery"; State B's local law would
diminish the plaintiff's recovery in the same proportion that his
negligence was a contributing cause of his injury. Does Professor
Weintraub intend the sentence we have italicized to refer to the
choice-of-law result that would be achieved by a court sitting in State
B? I don't think so. The language itself seems clearly to refer to the
local law of State B. Moreover, it would be unusual for a rule aimed
at simplifying the choice-of-law process in product liability actions
to require the forum (in our hypothetical, the State A court) to
determine how a court sitting in the other interested state (State B)
would resolve the choice-of-law problem as a condition precedent to
the forum's resolution of that problem. Thus, we seem to be left

40. Because the rule provides for mutual elections by defendant or plaintiff,
I am assuming that the available elections truly are "elective" and not "mandatory".
Compare with the exclusive election afforded the plaintiff with regard to punitive
damages discussed infra note 179.
41. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
42. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508 (italics added).
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with the conclusion that Professor Weintraub's rule provides no
resolution for our hypothetical problem.
Is there something so bizarre about the hypothetical that no rational
rule would be likely to have applicability? The only aspect of the
hypothetical that raises a question in my mind is how defendant
became vulnerable to jurisdiction in State A. If the defendant's
product is not available in State A through commercial channels and
plaintiff's injury did not occur in State A, it is unlikely that defendant
would be subject to the "specific jurisdiction ' 3 of a court sitting in
State A. Of course, it is entirely possible that, although defendant
does not market the defective product in State A, defendant may
have a sufficiently pervasive presence within that state to justify the
assertion of "general jurisdiction. '" 44 Consequently, there would seem
to be nothing bizarre about the jurisdictional aspect of our hypothetical.
Moreover, we can eliminate the jurisdictional problem entirely
simply by having our plaintiff bring the action in State B, defendant's

43. Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transport Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1036 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted)(emphasis in original):
International Shoe held that states may authorize their"courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents if the out-of-state defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance 0f fhe suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice ......
Attempting to give specific content to the "fair play and'substantial justice"
formulation, Chief Justice Stone catalogued cases involving out-of-state corporations. First, where the corporation's in-state activity was "continuous and
systematic" and that activity gave rise to the episode in suit, personal jurisdiction unquestionably could be asserted .... InternationalShoe itself ranked

in that category. Further, the commission of "some single or occasional acts"
in a state might be sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit in the
state with respect to those acts, though not with respect to matters totally
unrelated to the forum connections .... These categories, sometimes described

by the label "specific jurisdiction," have comprised the area in which the
most significant development has occurred since InternationalShoe. "Longarm" statutes and rules reflect that development.
44. Id. at 1037:
The textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign
corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum is Perkins v. Benquet
Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437... (1952). Defendant was a Philippine
corporation and its mining operations were centered in the Philippines. During
World War II, however, the company's operations were halted and suit in the
Philippines was not possible because of the Japanese occupation. Ohio, at the
time the lawsuit commenced, appeared to have more sustained contact with
the company than any other forum open to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
held that due process limitations would not be transgressed if an Ohio state
court entertained a suit against the mining company brought by a nonresident
of Ohio on a claim that had arisen outside the state.
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state of domicile. Then, the court sitting in State B where defendant
is unquestionably subject to jurisdiction would be confronted with
precisely the same choice-of-law problem faced by the State A court.
Assuming that the court in State B utilizes interest analysis, its
resolution of the problem might be exactly the same as that achieved
by the State A forum: application of State A's local law and
disallowance of the defendant's comparative negligence defense. That
choice-of-law problem laid before the State B court, like the same
problem before the State A court, would simply be unprovided for
in Professor Weintraub's rule. The inapplicability of the rule to this
problem would subsist irrespective of the forum or the choice-of-law
result achieved by either court.
If that comes as a surprise to the reader, please know that it
surprised me as well. Our hypothetical was the result of my effort
to fashion a simple choice-of-law problem for the purpose of comparing the result that would be achieved through interest analysis
with the result that would be achieved under Professor Weintraub's
rule. In fact, it was the first hypothetical because of its relative
simplicity. If Professor Weintraub's rule doesn't meet a basic choiceof-law problem which is likely to arise in a product liability action,
there may be some weakness inherent in the rule.
The weakness is a surprising one.. In the earlier fashioning of his
three rules for resolving all choice-of-law problems in tort actions,
Professor Weintraub assiduously avoided the trap of making the rules
fact-specific. Those rules required the use of interest analysis in order
to determine whether the case presented a false conflict, a true
conflict, or a "no interest" case. 45 Only after that determination was
made, did the rules provide a resolution. However, Professor Weintraub's rule for product liability cases does not require a similar
application of interest analysis. Rather, this rule operates on facts
without requiring that those facts and the local laws of the potentially
interested states be subjected to analysis for the purpose of identifying
competing state interests. I'm inclined to think that hardly anyone,
no matter how brilliant, can fashion a set of fact-specific rules likely
to accommodate all future fact patterns."

45. Commentary, supra note 5, at 360.
46. In Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58,
335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 70 (1972), Judge Fuld fashioned the following three rules to
resolve all future choice-of-law problems involving automobile guest statutes:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same
state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and
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Let's modify our simple hypothetical. Let's retain all the facts and
the State A forum, but let's transpose local laws. Now it is State
A's local law that permits the 402A defendant to diminish damages
through comparative negligence; State B's local law does not permit
the defendant to thus diminish damages. Presumably, the reasons
underlying those local laws would remain the same. State A's law
would be aimed at preserving the economic integrity of State A
domiciled defendant sellers by enabling them to effect an equitable

distribution of the economic loss resulting from the use of a defective
product. State B's law would be intended to regulate conduct, deter
the sale of defective products, and to protect the economic integrity
of State B domiciled injured victims. Since the defendant seller is
domiciled in State B, State A would not have a significant interest
in having its pro-seller law applied. Similarly, since the plaintiff is
domiciled in State A, State B would not have a significant interest

determine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and
that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be
held liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him
under the tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the
guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery,
the driver who has come into that state should not-in the absence of special
circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled
in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the
applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred
but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will
advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth
working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
The first guest statute case to reach the New York Court of Appeals after
Neumeier was Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 119, 296 N.E.2d 243, 343
N.Y.S.2d 341 (1973). Plaintiff passenger, Mrs. Pahmer, and defendant driver,
Mr. Cullen, were New York domiciliaries employed by the same employer and
temporarily assigned to California. During the course of a non-business related
trip, the car occupied by them and registered in California, was involved in
a collision. To recover for her injuries, passenger sued the driver. Defendant
driver asserted the California guest statute. CAL. VEr. CODE § 17158 (West
1959) (amended 1973). Plaintiff asserted the applicability of New York's local
law which did not include a guest statute. None of the three rules fashioned
in Neumeier would have been applicable to the case. The court was spared
the awkwardness of so conceding because the California guest statute had
been declared unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court. Brown v.
Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973). Consequently,
the guest statute defense was unavailing. Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 32 N.Y.2d
at 122, 296 N.E.2d at 245, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 343. The three rules fashioned in
Neumeier were simply too fact-specific to accommodate all future guest statute
cases.
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in having its pro-victim law applied. However, State B's interest in
conduct regulation would be significant. Since the conduct intended
to be deterred (the sale of a defective product), occurred in State B,
that state would have a significant interest in applying its local law
to preclude the seller from invoking comparative negligence. In this
instance, interest analysis indicates a false conflict: only one of the
states, State B, has a significant interest in the application of its
local law; State A has no significant interest in the application of its
local law permitting the seller to utilize comparative negligence.
However, having determined that State A has no significant interest
in the application of its own local law, we are now free to determine
whether State A has any minimal interest in the litigation.47 Given
the plaintiff's domicile in that state, it is clear that State A does
have a minimal interest in this litigation. How would that minimal
interest of State A best be served? Obviously, by the application of
State B's local law which precludes use of the comparative negligence
statute to diminish the plaintiff's recovery. 48 Thus, State B's significant interest in the application of its own local law and State A's
minimal interest in the litigation, both point to the application of
State B's local law. Consequently, the State A court, recognizing the
false conflict, would apply State B's local law and grant the plaintiff's
motion to strike the comparative negligence defense.
How would Professor Weintraub's rule resolve the choice-of-law
issue? Rule (I)(A) would not apply because neither "the product that
caused the harm" 49 nor "products of the same type" 50 are sold in
State A "through commercial channels."'" Rule (I)(B), however,
would apply and would permit the defendant to choose the law of
the plaintiff's domicile, State A.12 Application of State A's local law

47. Once it is concluded that State A has no significant interest in the
application of its own local law, inquiry into whether State A has any minimal
interest in the litigation will generate no spurious internal conflict on the part
of State A.
48. In each instance in which it is determined that State A has only a
minimal interest in the litigation, inquiry into which state's local law, State
A's or State B's, will best serve State A's minimal interest in the litigation
will point to the local law of State B. If the inquiry were to point to the local
law of State A, it would be necessary to conclude that the earlier determination
that State A had no significant interest in the application of its own local law
had been erroneous.
49. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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would benefit the defendant's cause by reducing his liability to the
extent of the plaintiff's fault. Consequently, even though interest
analysis would indicate that State A has no significant interest in the
application of its local law to this case, Professor Weintraub's rule
would permit the defendant to assert the comparative negligence
defense available under the local law of State A. This result is
troubling because it seems to contravene both the interest analysis
conclusion and, arguably, the due process and full faith and credit
test of Hague." Why, in these circumstances, would Professor Weintraub's rule permit the defendant to invoke State A's local law?
I suspect the facile answer may be because State A's law permitting
the seller to assert comparative negligence evidences a lack of concern
with protecting State A victims. Since State A has no concern with
protecting its domiciled plaintiff, defendant should be free to utilize
that state's defendant-favoring law. But the facility of that answer
may not be capable of withstanding analysis. State A's law permitting
the seller to assert comparative negligence was intended to benefit
State A sellers (even against State A victims), not State B sellers.
Since the defendant is a State B seller and thus not within the class
intended to be protected by State A's law, State A would have no
interest in the application of that local law (and certainly not to the
litigation disadvantage of a State A plaintiff). Again, Professor
Weintraub's rule, because of its emphasis on facts, seems to provide
an unsatisfactory and, in this instance, arguably unconstitutional
result. Interest analysis, by contrast, examines the facts in light of
each state's local law, and the reasons underlying each local law.
This approach allows the court to determine which, if any, of the
respective states' reasons converts into a significant interest in having
that state's law applied. This last analysis clearly yields a constitutionally permissible result.
Let's change our hypothetical once more. State A remains the
forum and all facts remain the same with one difference: defendant's
5' 4
product is distributed in State A "through commercial channels.
Let's retain our transposed local laws; State A permits the 402A
defendant to invoke comparative negligence and State B does not.
Plaintiff, domiciled in State A, purchased and was injured by defendant's product in State B. We have already identified the reason
underlying State A's law permitting the seller to assert comparative

53.

Hague, 449 U.S. 302. See supra note 30.

54. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
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negligence: to protect the economic integrity of sellers domiciled in
State A. And we have identified the reasons underlying State B's
law precluding the comparative negligence defense: to deter the sale
of defective products, and to assure that State B domiciled victims
do not become indigent wards of that state. Again, since defendant
seller is domiciled in State B, the reason underlying State A's law
does not convert into a significant interest on the part of State A in
having its local law applied. Similarly, since plaintiff is domiciled in
State A, State B's concern for its domiciled victims does not convert
into a significant interest on the part of State B in having its local
law applied. However, the conduct regulating reason underlying State
B's law does so convert since the defective product was sold in that
state. Again, interest analysis would indicate a false conflict: only
State B has a significant interest in having its local law, precluding
comparative negligence, applied. And again, State A's minimal interest in the litigation, arising out of plaintiff's domicile in State A,
would best be served by the application of State B's law. Therefore,
the State A court would apply State B's local law and grant plaintiff's
motion to strike the comparative negligence defense.
How about Professor Weintraub's rule? Because products of the
type which caused plaintiff's injury are sold in State A, rule (I)(A)
would "[a]pply the law of plaintiff's habitual residence"," State A,
and would permit the defendant seller to assert the comparative
negligence defense. Again, the rule would produce a result contrary
to that suggested by interest analysis. This result would arguably be
unconstitutional because of the absence of any interest on the part
of State A in having its local law applied. Why? Apparently, because
of reliance on facts alone; since the defendant sells its product in
State A, that state's law should apply. Such a result would seem to
ignore the local law of each state, the reasons underlying those local
laws, and which, if any, of those reasons converts into a significant
interest on the part of each state in having its law applied. Once
more, the rule would produce a dubious and, under Hague,5 6 perhaps
an unconstitutional result.
In our original hypothetical, Professor Weintraub's rule simply did
not provide an answer to the choice-of-law problem. In the spin-offs
of that hypothetical, the rule produced a result contrary to the

55.
56.

Id.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302. See supra note 30.
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conclusion suggested by interest analysis and a result that may be
57
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Hague.
Let's return to our original hypothetical. Plaintiff is domiciled in
State A, defendant in State B. Plaintiff acquired and was injured by
the product in State B. State A is the forum. State A's local law
precludes the 402A defendant from utilizing the comparative negligence statute. State B's local law would permit the defendant to
invoke the comparative negligence statute.
We have already identified the reasons underlying State A's local
law: conduct regulation and a desire to assure that its domiciled
victims do not become indigent wards of the state. Because plaintiff
is domiciled in State A, both of those reasons would convert into
significant interests on the part of State A in having its local law
applied. The ongoing consequences of defendant's conduct will be
felt in State A and the victim, if restricted to a diminished recovery,
might well become an indigent ward of State A.
We have identified one reason for State B's local law: to protect
the economic integrity of defendants domiciled in State B. Since our
hypothetical defendant is domiciled in State B, that reason converts
into a significant interest on the part of State B in having its local
law applied. But suppose the defendant asserts a second reason for
State B's law: conduct regulation. Defendant may argue that one
reason State B permits the 402A defendant to invoke the comparative
negligence statute is to deter negligent use of even defective products.
Assume that the opinions of the highest appellate court of State B
corroborate defendant's argument. 8 Does that conduct regulating

57.

Id.

58. Prior to 1985, the appellate courts of Louisiana had held that
contributory negligence was not an available defense in product liability cases.
LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980):
This court has previously held that contributory negligence is not a defense
to a strict products liability claim under Louisiana law ....

These holdings

are bolstered by opinions of the Louisiana appellate courts, holding that
recovery is barred by victim fault only in the form of assumption of the riskthat is, voluntary and unreasonable use of a product with full knowledge and
appreciation of its defect and the danger involved-as opposed to contributory
negligence.
Id. at 991.
In 1985 the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462
So.2d 166 (La. 1985). In Bell, the court decided that "the defense of contributory
negligence as a complete bar to recovery should be rejected entirely and that
comparative fault may be applied in certain categories of cases to reduce the
plaintiff's recovery." Id. at 171.
Where the threat of a reduction in recovery will provide consumers with an
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reason convert into a significant interest on the part of State B in
having its local law applied? Since the conduct intended to be
regulated occurred in State B and the immediate consequences of
that conduct, plaintiff's injury, occurred in State B, the conduct
regulating reason does indeed convert into a second significant interest
on the part of State B in having its local law applied..
Now we have a rather evenly balanced true conflict. State A has
a significant interest in the application of its local law precluding use
of the comparative negligence statute based on its desire (1) to avoid
having its domiciled victim become an indigent ward of the state,
and (2) to have the defective product seller feel an undiluted sting
of liability in order to deter the future sale of defective products.
State B also has a significant interest in the application of its local
law permitting use of the comparative negligence statute based on
its desire (1) to avoid having its domiciled seller become bankrupt,
and (2) to have the negligent product user suffer a diminished
recovery in order to deter the future negligent use of such products.
As before, I believe that State A's interest in having its domiciled
victim avoid indigence is of greater significance than State B's interest
in having its domiciled seller avoid bankruptcy; given an adverse
choice-of-law result, the victim's indigence seems more likely to
eventuate than the commercial seller's bankruptcy. But what about
each state's interest in conduct regulation?
Since both states' interests in conduct regulation are intended to
preserve and protect human life, each is of significant moment.
Because one of the basic purposes of 402A is to stimulate the
defendant to utilize its superior expertness to market a defect-free

incentive to use a product carefully, without exacting an inordinate sacrifice
of other interests, comparative principles should be applied for the sake of
accident prevention. The recovery of a plaintiff who has been injured by a
defective product should not be reduced, however, in those types of cases in
which it does not serve realistically to promote careful product use or where
it drastically reduces the manufacturer's incentive to make a safer product.
Id. at 171-72.
In McCaskill v. Welch, 463 So.2d 942 (La. Ct. App. 1985), the court read Bell
as requiring that "the question of whether comparative fault is applicable in a
products liability case must be decided on a case by case basis." Id. at 947. The
McCaskill court applied comparative fault where the defendant, who "must be
considered a manufacturer," had manufactured oil well pumping units at the request
of the plaintiff. Id. Defendant, "a welder by trade [had] no prior experience in the
manufacture of oil well pumping units. . .

."

Id. at 945. "We do not find that this

is the kind of case where the application of comparative fault would serve to
drastically reduce a manufacturer's incentive to make a safer product." Id. at 947.
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product and thus protect the less expert product user, the court could
conclude that State A's conduct regulating interest is superior to that
of State B. On the other hand, the court could conclude that because
plaintiff would enjoy a recovery under either state's local law, albeit
a diminished recovery under State B's local law, application of State
B's law would less impair State A's interest than would application
of State A's local law impair State B's interest. Of course, the
prospect of thus diminishing plaintiff's recovery would intensify State
A's concern that its injured victim would become an indigent ward
of the state. The choice-of-law issue really is a close one. Let's
assume that the court, primarily concerned with conduct regulation
aimed at preserving human life, concludes that the application of
State B's local law would produce the result best effectuating each
state's interest in conduct regulation. To the extent that the plaintiff
enjoys a recovery, State A's interest in regulating the conduct of the
defendant would be vindicated. To the extent that the recovery is
diminished, State B's interest in regulating the conduct of the plaintiff
would be served. Therefore, the court would apply State B's local
law and deny plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's partial defense
of contributory negligence.
What result would Professor Weintraub's rule produce? Since
neither "the product that caused" 5 9 plaintiff's injury nor "products
6
of the same type are available . . . through commercial channels"
in State A, plaintiff's domicile, rule (I)(A) would not apply. Under
rule (I)(B), defendant would be free to "choose' '6 the law of State
A, but, since it is State A's law that precludes utilization of the
comparative negligence statute, defendant would have no interest in
selecting that law. Under rule (I)(C), plaintiff could "elect" 62 the law
of State B, but, since it is State B's law that permits utilization of
the comparative negligence statute, plaintiff would have no interest
in selecting that law. The caveat to the rule provides that if "both
defendant's and plaintiff's states wish plaintiff to have the advantage
of the higher recovery available under defendant's law, then that is
the law that should be applied."' Obviously, that language does not
apply to our hypothetical since it is defendant's (State B's) law that
would impose the diminished recovery. Once more, we seem to be

59. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
60. Id.
61.

Id.

62. Id.
63. Id.
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left with the conclusion that neither the rule nor its caveat provides
a solution to our choice-of-law problem.
II.

STRICT LIABILITY AND AN IMPLEADED THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT

Plaintiff was injured .while riding as a passenger in an automobile
manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff is domiciled in State A, defendant in State B. The accident occurred in State B. At the time of
the accident, the car was being operated by T, a State A domiciliary
who had purchased the car in State A. To recover for his injuries,
plaintiff sues defendant in State A, alleging liability under section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 4 More specifically,
plaintiff alleges that the accident was caused by a defective steering
system which existed at the time the car left defendant's hands in
State B, the state in which defendant manufactured the car. Defendant responds to the complaint by impleading T as a third-party
defendant. Defendant alleges that, even if it is liable under section
402A, it has a right of contribution from T because his negligent
operation of the vehicle contributed to the accident and to plaintiff's
injuries. T moves to dismiss the third-party complaint against him.
State A's local law precludes a 402A defendant from seeking
contribution from a third-party defendant who negligently used the
402A defendant's product.6 5 State B's local law permits the 402A

64.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See supra note 25.
65. Rhoads v. Ford Motor Co., 374 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd
on other grounds, 514 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1975). In Rhoads, the district court,
exercising diversity jurisdiction, predicted that (1) Pennsylvania would preclude the
product liability defendant from asserting contributory negligence, and (2) Pennsylvania would preclude the product liability defendant from seeking contribution from
an impleaded third-party defendant who had negligently used the defective product.
374 F. Supp. at 1320. The Third Circuit concluded that there had been insufficient
evidence of negligence on the part of the product user to have submitted the issue
to the jury. "Our decision in this respect renders it unnecessary to reach [defendant's]
arguments that the contributory negligence of a driver (1) would bar recovery under
§ 402A, or (2) entitle the manufacturer of a defective product to contribution." 514
F.2d at 935. The district court's prediction that Pennsylvania would not permit the
product liability defendant to assert the contributory negligence defense was accurate.
McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 15-16, 342 A.2d 381, 382
(1975): "Today, we complete our acceptance of the principles delineated in comment
n by rejecting contributory negligence as an available defense in 402A cases."
Whether Pennsylvania would permit the product liability defendant to enjoy contribution from an impleaded third-party defendant who negligently used the defective
product is less clear. In Rabatin v. Columbus Lines, Inc., 790 F.2d 22 (3d Cir.
1986), the court, exercising diversity jurisdiction, predicted that Pennsylvania would
permit the product liability defendant to enjoy contribution from another defendant
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defendant to seek contribution from such an allegedly negligent thirdparty defendant. 6 The forum, State A, utilizes interest analysis.
The State A court would be required to determine the reasons
underlying State A's local law precluding such contribution. The
court probably would determine that its local law has a conduct
regulating reason: to dissuade sellers from marketing defective products by making such sellers feel the full sting of liability. Since a
part of the conduct intended to be regulated, the sale, occurred in
State A and since the ongoing consequences of that conduct will be
felt in State A, the plaintiff victim's domicile, the court would
conclude that the conduct regulating reason underlying State A's
local law converted into a significant interest on the part of State A
in having its law applied.
Then the court in State A would be required to determine the
reason underlying State B's local law which permits the 402A defendant to seek contribution from such a third-party defendant. The
court would likely find that State B's law is intended to achieve an
equitable distribution of the economic loss by permitting such contribution. In other words, State B's local law is intended to protect
the economic integrity of State B domiciled sellers by permitting
them to recoup a portion of the damages from a negligent thirdparty defendant product user. Since defendant is a State B domiciled

which had negligently failed to correct the defect in the product. Rabatin stated:
"To the extent that Rhoads v. Ford Motor Co., 374 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Pa.
1974), aff'd on other grounds, 514 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1974), suggests that a strictly
liable defendant and a negligent defendant as a matter of law may not be joint
tortfeasors because their liability is inherently on a 'different plane,' we overrule
it." 790 F.2d at 26 n.3. Rhoads and Rabatin, however, may be distinguishable. In
Rhoads, defendant sought contribution from a third-party defendant who was not
sued by the victims of the defective product. In Rabatin, the product liability
defendant sought contribution from a negligent defendant, an entity which had been
sued by the victim of the defective product. In Svetz v. Land Tool Co., 355 Pa.
Super. 230, 513 A.2d 403 (1986), the court held that the product liability defendant
could seek contribution from allegedly negligent additional defendants joined by the
original defendant. In Svetz, unlike Rhoads, neither of the additional defendants
had been a user of the allegedly defective product.
66. Cf., Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 386 Mass. 95, 434 N.E.2d 1008 (1982);
Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of New Jersey, 81 N.J. 548, 410 A.2d 674 (1980);
Sanchez v. City of Espanola, 94 N.M 676, 615 P.2d 993 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espanola, 95 N.M. 66, 618
P.2d 1230 (1980); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 -P.2d 441,
146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978); Skinner v. Red-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill.
2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Northwestern Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Stromme, 4 Wash. App. 85, 479 P.2d 554 (1971).
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seller, that reason for State B's local law converts into a significant
interest on the part of State B in having its law applied.
But suppose that counsel for defendant asserts that State B's local
law has a second underlying reason: conduct regulation. Counsel
argues that State B permits the seller to seek contribution from the
impleaded allegedly negligent driver as a means of deterring negligent
driving in State B. Should the court accept the argument? I don't
think so. Plaintiff would have been entirely free to sue the driver as
well as the seller or the driver alone, or the seller alone under the
laws of both State A and State B. Consequently, at the time of the
operative facts (while T was driving the car in State B), T had no
way of knowing that plaintiff eventually would sue only the seller.
At that critical time, T could not have anticipated that his liability,
if any, would turn on whether or not the seller would be permitted
to seek contribution from T through impleader. As far as T knew
at that critical time, if his driving was negligent, he would face
potential liability directly to plaintiff. Ultimately, subjecting thirdparty defendant T to potential contribution liability to the seller
hardly seems likely to be a feasible additional conduct regulating
device. Therefore, I think the court in State A should not impute
that conduct regulating reason to State B's local law.
Having found that State A's conduct regulating desire to dissuade
sellers from marketing defective products converts into a significant
interest on the part of State A in having its local law applied, and
that State B's concern with protecting the economic integrity of the
State B seller converts into a significant interest on the part of State
B in having its local law applied, the court in State A would recognize
that it was confronted with a true conflict. Under Hague, application
of either state's local law would be constitutionally permissible.
However, to achieve the most appropriate result, the court would be
required to determine which state had the more significant interest
in the application of its local law. I am inclined to think that the
court would find that State A's conduct regulating reason generated
the more significant interest. An interest aimed at protecting and
preserving human life would seem to be of greater moment than an
interest in preserving the economic integrity of sellers. Consequently,
the court in State A would apply State A's local law precluding the
contribution sought by the defendant and would grant T's motion
to dismiss the third-party complaint.
How would Professor Weintraub's rule resolve the same choiceof-law issue? I confess to being at something of a loss for an answer.
Rule (I) applies "[tlo determine whether plaintiff will be compensated
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and the extent of compensation for actual damages. 6 7 Our hypothetical relates to defendant seller's ability to enjoy contribution from
a third-party defendant impleaded by the defendant and not sued by
plaintiff; therefore, it has nothing to do with "whether plaintiff will
be compensated and the extent of compensation for actual damages. '" 61 Rule (II) applies to "issues affecting the availability and
measurement of punitive damages" ;69 obviously, our hypothetical
does not concern punitive damages. Consequently, our basic choiceof-law problem would seem to be unprovided for by Professor
Weintraub's rule. Confronted with that quandary, there are, I think,
three alternatives. First, we could simply accept the fact that our
basic choice-of-law problem is not covered by Professor Weintraub's
rule and note that this appears to be the third such basic issue that
is unprovided for in the rule. Second, we could pretend that our
hypothetical goes to whether and to what extent plaintiff will be
compensated for actual damages. The pretense, however, would
become painfully apparent. Since our plaintiff elected to sue only
the manufacturer and not the driver, the rational conclusion would
seem to be that plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel had determined that
defendant manufacturer had the capacity to satisfy any judgment
plaintiff might enjoy. Therefore, even if the language "whether
plaintiff will be compensated ' 70 were stretched beyond its apparent
intended meaning (whether the law would permit such compensation)
to include whether plaintiff would enjoy satisfaction of any judgment
obtained, the language still would not reach our hypothetical. Third,
we could attempt to treat defendant seller seeking contribution as
-the "plaintiff" and the impleaded third-party defendant driver as
the "defendant" and proceed from there. However, there are a few
inherently awkward problems in doing so. First, the defendant manufacturer would hardly seem to be the product liability "plaintiff"
contemplated by the rule. Second, the third-party defendant driver
would hardly seem to be the product liability "defendant" contemplated by the rule. That awkwardness can be demonstrated by an
attempted application of rule (I)(A) which would apply the law of
plaintiff's (manufacturer's) domicile "if the product that caused the
harm or products of the same type are available there through

67. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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commercial channels and the defendant (driver) should have foreseen
this availability." ' 7' Assuming that manufacturer's cars are regularly
offered for sale in State B, manufacturer's domicile, State B's local
law, permitting contribution, would be applied if the "defendant
(driver) should have foreseen this availability."72 Obviously, the
driver's capacity to foresee distribution of the manufacturer's cars
in State B would be irrelevant to a rational resolution of our choiceof-law problem and beyond the apparent intended reach of rule
(I)(A). We seem to be left with the conclusion that Professor Weintraub's rule simply doesn't cover our hypothetical choice-of-law
problem.
Let's change our hypothetical by transposing the local laws. Now,
State A's local law permits the 402A defendant to seek contribution
from an allegedly negligent third-party defendant, and State B's local
law precludes such contribution. Presumably, State A's law exists to
protect the economic integrity of sellers domiciled in State A by
affording them the opportunity to recover a portion of the damages
from such a third-party defendant. Since the defendant seller is
domiciled in State B, not State A, the reason underlying State A's
local law would not convert into a significant interest on the part of
State A in having its law applied. Presumably, State B's law has a
conduct regulating purpose: to deter the sale of defective products.
Although the driver purchased the car in State A, the vehicle was
manufactured by the defendant in State B. In all likelihood, State B
would consider the manufacture of defective products to be within
the ambit of the conduct to be deterred by its local law. Since that
conduct occurred in State B, that state would have a significant.
interest in the application of its local law to this case. This conclusion
would be supported by the fact that the immediate consequences of
the conduct, the crash, occurred in State B. Interest analysis would
indicate that the case presents a false conflict: only State B has a
significant interest in the application of its local law. Having concluded that State A has no significant interest in the application of
its local law, the court would be free to determine if State A has a
minimal interest in the litigation and, if so, how that minimal interest
would best be served. Since the third-party defendant is domiciled in
State A, that state would seem to have a minimal interest in the
litigation: protecting the economic integrity of its domiciled third-

71.
72.

Id.
Id. (italics added).
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party defendant. Obviously, that minimal interest is best served by
the application of State B's local law precluding contribution. The
court in State A, therefore, would apply State B's local law and
grant the driver's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint.
How would Professor Weintraub's rule resolve our amended hypothetical? I'm afraid the answer is that the rule would be inapplicable for each of the reasons that it was inapplicable to the basic
hypothetical. Again, the issue in our amended hypothetical does not
go to whether or to what extent the plaintiff will be compensated
for actual damages. Indeed, it does not go even to the capacity of
the seller to satisfy any judgment enjoyed by the plaintiff. And
treating the seller as "plaintiff" and the driver as "defendant" would
be as awkward here as in the basic hypothetical. Our amended
hypothetical, like the basic one, is simply unprovided for in the rule.
III.

USE OF STATUTE TO EVIDENCE NEGLIGENCE

Mother and adult daughter, domiciled in State A, were killed when
the car driven by the mother left the traveled portion of the roadway,
overran the berm, and crashed in State A. Wrongful death actions
were brought in State A against defendant car manufacturer, domiciled in State B. Plaintiffs, surviving spouses and personal representatives of the decedents' estates and domiciliaries of State A, alleged
that the defendant had violated the recall provision of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. More specifically, plaintiffs
alleged that notification sent by the defendant to owners of cars
covered by the recall was inadequate in that it warned only of the
possibility of a partial loss of steering caused by a stone's becoming
lodged between steering coupling and frame; the manufacturer's
warning failed to state that a total loss of steering would result when
a stone became so lodged. Plaintiffs alleged that this inadequate
warning caused the decedents' deaths. In addition, plaintiffs alleged
that defendant further violated the federal recall provision by failing
to make available to its dealers an adequate number of steering
coupling shields necessary to correct the problem. 73 Under the local
law of State A, the defendant's violations of the federal act would

73. The hypothetical in the text is based on Lowe v. General Motors Corp.,
624 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1980). In Lowe, as in the hypothetical, plaintiffs alleged
that defendant was negligent per se because of its "violation of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, . . . 15 U.S.C.A. § 1402 (1974) (current
version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1411, (West Supp. 1980)." Id. at 1375.
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be treated just as a violation of State A criminal law would be
treated in a negligence action. If the victims were within the class of
persons intended to be protected by the statute and if the peril that
occasioned the victims' injuries was one the statute was intended to
protect against, the statute would be deemed applicable and its
violation would be negligence as a matter of law. Clearly, this is the
case in our hypothetical. Therefore, State A's local law would treat
defendant's violation of the federal law as negligence per se. State
B's local law, on the other hand, would give no legal effect to the
federal law in such a state law negligence action.
Assuming that the forum, State A, utilizes interest analysis, the
court would attempt to identify the reasons underlying each state's
local law. Presumably, the reason underlying State A's law which
would treat a violation of the federal act as negligence per se is
conduct regulation. State A hopes to deter violations of such federal
law, thus diminishing the likelihood of injuries or deaths. That
conduct regulating reason would convert into a significant interest
on the part of State A in having its law applied if the conduct
intended to be regulated occurred in State A, or the immediate
consequences of that conduct occurred in State A, or the ongoing
consequences of that conduct would be felt in State A. Since the
fatal crash (the immediate consequences) occurred in State A and
the decedents had been and their respective dependent survivors
continue to be domiciled in State A (the ongoing consequences),
State A would have a significant interest in the application of its
local law. State B's local law which would give no legal effect to the
violation of federal law presumably exists to protect the economic
integrity of defendants domiciled in State B. Apparently, State B
believes that its domiciled defendants should be immunized from
liability generated by such a federal law in a state law negligence
action. Since the defendant is a State B domiciliary, State B would
have a significant interest in the application of its local law. Interest
analysis, therefore, indicates a true conflict. I would be inclined to
think that the State A court would conclude that its conduct regulating reason, aimed at protecting and preserving human life, generated an interest more significant than the admittedly legitimate
interest of State B in preserving the economic integrity of that state's
domiciled defendants. Consequently, State A would apply its own
local law and treat defendant's violation of the federal act as negligence per se.
What result would Professor Weintraub's rule produce? Rule (I)(A)
would seem to point to State A's local law as well. Assuming that
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the choice-of-law issue goes to "whether plaintiff will be
compensated ' 7 4 and that the injury-producing product (the car manufactured by defendant) is "available ' 75 in "plaintiff's habitual residence ... through commercial channels," ' 76 the rule would apply
State A's local law. In this instance, interest analysis and Professor
Weintraub's rule would produce similar results.
But let's transpose the local laws of State A and State B and see
what happens. Now it is State A's law that would give no legal
effect to the violation of the federal act and State B's law that would
treat such a violation as negligence per se. The reason underlying
State A's law, protection of the economic integrity of State A
domiciled defendants, would seem not to convert into a significant
interest on the part of State A since the defendant is domiciled in
State B. The reason underlying State B's law, conduct regulation,
would convert into a significant interest on the part of State B in
having its local law applied if the conduct intended to be regulated
occurred there, or the immediate consequences of the conduct occurred there, or the ongoing consequences of the conduct would be
felt there. We have already concluded that the immediate consequences (the crash) occurred in State A and that the ongoing consequences (the deaths of decedents and the loss sustained by their
dependent survivors) will be felt in State A. But where did the
conduct itself occur? Since the conduct consisted of preparing and
sending an inadequate notification and failing to provide an adequate
number of corrective devices, presumably that conduct occurred in
State B, defendant's domicile. Therefore, State B would have a
significant interest in the application of its local law under which
defendant's violation of the federal act would be treated as negligence
per se. Interest analysis indicates a false conflict. Of the two states,
only State B has a significant interest in the application of its local
law. Having determined that State A has no significant interest in
the application of its own local law, the forum court would determine
whether State A has a minimal interest in the litigation and, if so,
how that minimal interest would best be served. The court would
find that State A, as the plaintiffs' domicile, has a minimal interest
in the litigation which would best be served by the application of
the local law of State B which treats violations of the federal act as

74.
75.
76.

Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
Id.
Id.
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negligence per se. Consequently, the State A court would apply State
B's law and the defendant would be found negligent as a matter of
law.
How about Professor Weintraub's rule? Still assuming that the
choice-of-law issue goes to "whether plaintiff will be compensated" 77
'
and that the injury-producing product (the car) is "available" 78
in
'
79
"plaintiff's habitual residence
(State A) "through commercial
channels," 80 rule (I)(A) would apply the local law of State A and
defendant's violation of the federal law would be given no legal
efficacy. The rule would produce that result despite the fact that
interest analysis indicates that State A has no significant interest in
the application of its own local law and that State B is the only state
with a significant interest in the application of its own local law.
Consequently, the rule would produce a result contrary to that
achieved through interest analysis; such a result is constitutionally
suspect under Hague.81 Moreover, the result produced by the rule,
application of State A's local law, would frustrate State A's minimal
interest in the litigation which is best served by the application of
State B's local law. Why? Once again, the answer seems to be that
the rule is unduly fact-specific and inadequately related to the reasons
underlying the different local laws and whether or not those underlying reasons convert into an interest on the part of each state in
having its local law applied.

IV.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Plaintiff, decedent's widow and a domiciliary of State A, brings
a wrongful death action in a State A court against a cigarette
manufacturer which is domiciled in State B. Plaintiff alleges that
defendant's cigarettes caused the death of the decedent, a State A
domiciliary. It is plaintiff's contention that defendant's product was
defective and unreasonably dangerous because of defendant's failure
to afford users adequate warnings of the dangers incident to the use
of cigarettes. Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint, asserting
that the warnings accompanying its product were consistent with
those warnings required by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-

77.
78.

Id.
Id.

79.

Id.

80.
81.

Id.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302. See supra note 30.
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vertising Act8 2 and that the federal act preempted the pre-existing
state common law on which the plaintiff's action is based. The
highest appellate court of State A has concluded that the federal act
did not preempt the state law on which plaintiff's claim is based.83
The highest appellate court of State B has concluded that the federal
act did effect such a preemption. 4 Obviously, defendant's motion to
dismiss is based on State B's law and plaintiff's opposition to the
motion rests on State A's law.
This creates a preliminary issue for consideration: Does the case
actually present a choice-of-law problem? Ultimately, of course, the
Supreme Court of the United States may resolve the preemption
argument one way or the other. In the meantime, however, what
should the State A court do with regard to defendant's motion to
dismiss? I suppose it would be possible for the court to conclude
that no choice-of-law problem was presented. Rather, State A and
State B have arrived at different conclusions as to federal preemption
and State A will simply apply its own view and deny defendant's
motion to dismiss. Along similar lines, the court could deny the
defendant's motion by concluding that the preemption issue was a
wholly federal matter and that, absent binding federal judicial authority, each court is entirely free to apply its own view of the issue.
There would be a logical underpinning to either of those related
approaches. At the same time, either approach might suggest at least
a certain degree of judicial disingenuousness. The highest appellate
courts of State A and State B viewed the same federal act and the
same legislative history and yet arrived at different conclusions as to
preemption of their (presumably) similar common law of product
liability. Why? I would be inclined to believe that each court's
conclusion reflected its view of the underlying considerations and
that the two courts were influenced by divergent considerations.
That, in turn, suggests that the defendant's motion to dismiss may
indeed generate a choice-of-law problem: Which state's view of the
preemption issue should be applied? Let's treat the problem as raising
a choice-of-law issue and assume that State A uses interest analysis.
Presumably, State A's conclusion that the federal act did not
preempt state common law reflects that state's concern with conduct

82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1983).
83. Cf., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986),
rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
84. Cf., Cipolone v. Liggetts Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986);
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
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regulation. State A believes that preserving the common law duty to
afford adequate warnings will encourage cigarette manufacturers to
provide such warnings in their advertisements. That conduct regulating reason for State A's law would convert into a significant interest
on the part of that state in having its law applied if the conduct
intended to be regulated occurred in State A, or the immediate
consequences of that conduct occurred in State A, or the ongoing
consequences of that conduct will be felt in State A. Since decedent
was domiciled in State A and it was there that he used and was
injured by defendant's product, the immediate consequences of the
conduct occurred in State A. Because decedent died domiciled in
State A and his dependent spouse is there domiciled, the ongoing
consequences of the conduct will be felt in State A. Clearly, State
A has a significant interest in the application of its law which holds
that the federal act did not preempt the area. State B's law holding
that the federal act did preempt the field, presumably is the result
of that state's desire to protect the economic integrity of cigarette
manufacturers domiciled in that state. So long as their warnings
comply with the federal act, they are not to be subjected to liability
predicated on inadequate warnings. Since defendant is a State B
domiciliary, the manufacturer falls precisely within the protected
class. Hence, State B has a significant interest in the application of
its law. I would imagine that the State A court would conclude that
its conduct regulating interest, aimed at preserving and protecting
human life, was of greater significance than State B's interest in
protecting the economic integrity of that state's cigarette manufacturers. Therefore, the court would apply State A's law and deny
defendant's motion to dismiss.
What result would Professor Weintraub's rule yield? Rule (I)(A)
would produce the same result as interest analysis: application of
State A's law. Since the issue goes to "whether plaintiff will be
compensated" 8' 5 and defendant's product is "available" 8 6 in State A
"through commercial channels," ' the rule would "[a]pply the law
of plaintiff's habitual residence.' '8
Let's see what happens if we transpose local laws. Now it isState
A that finds federal preemption and State B that does not. Presum-

85.
86.
87.
88.

Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ably, the reason underlying State A's law is protection of the economic integrity of cigarette manufacturers which are domiciled in
that state. Because defendant is domiciled in State B, the reason
underlying State A's law would not convert into a significant interest
on the part of that state in having its law applied. The reason
underlying State B's law which denies preemption would be conduct
regulation. That reason would convert into a significant interest on
the part of State B in having its law applied if the conduct intended
to be regulated occurred there, or the immediate consequences of the
conduct occurred there, or the ongoing consequences of the conduct
will be felt there. While the immediate and ongoing consequences
occurred and will be felt in State A, the conduct itself, (the decision
to provide no warnings beyond those required by the federal act),
occurred in State B where the defendant is domiciled. Consequently,
State B would have a significant interest in having its law applied to
negate preemption. Interest analysis demonstrates a false conflict;
State B is the only state with a significant interest in having its law
applied.
Having concluded that State A has no significant interest in the
application of its law, the court would be free to determine if State
A had a minimal interest in the litigation and, if so, how that
minimal interest would best be served. Because the plaintiff is domiciled in State A, that state would have a minimal interest in the
litigation. Because it is State B's law that would permit plaintiff a
recovery, State A's minimal interest in the litigation would be best
served by the application of State B's law. Since State B is the only
state having a significant interest in the application of its own law,
and since State A's minimal interest in the litigation is best served
by State B's law, the State A court would apply State B's law and
deny defendant's motion to dismiss.
What result would be produced by Professor Weintraub's rule?
On the surface, it would appear that rule (I)(A) would continue to
apply the law of State A. Still assuming that the issue goes to
"whether plaintiff will be compensated" 89 and that defendant's product is "available" ' 9 in State A "through commercial channels," 91 the
rule would "[aipply the law of plaintiff's habitual residence." 92 Under

89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.
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State A's law, defendant's motion to dismiss would be granted. That
result would be troubling since interest analysis suggests that State
A has no significant interest in the application of its own law and
that State A's minimal interest in the litigation would best be served
by the application of State B's law. For those same reasons, the
result might be constitutionally suspect under Hague.93 And once
more it would be the fact-specific nature of the rule and its apparent
lack of an intimate relationship with the reasons underlying each
state's law and whether or not those reasons convert into state
interests in having its law applied that would generate the troubling
result.
Would Professor Weintraub's caveat overrule the applicability of
rule (I)(A)? The caveat provides:
It should be remembered that this rule is only a presumption that
is likely to represent the results of proper interest analysis and resolution of conflicts by drawing on transjurisdictional policies and trends.
If, as may sometimes occur, both defendant's and plaintiff's states
wish plaintiff to have the advantage of the higher recovery available
under defendant's law, then that is the law that should be applied. 94
Rule (I)(A) has potential applicability to issues going to "whether
plaintiff will be compensated and the extent of compensation for
actual damages." 95 Our hypothetical poses an issue of whether plaintiff will be compensated; it does not pose an issue of the extent of
compensation. The caveat's explicit language seems to be applicable
only to those cases in which both states would "wish plaintiff to
have the advantage of the higher recovery.''9 Since rule (I)(A) is
carefully worded so as to have potential applicability in determining
both whether or not plaintiff will be compensated and the extent of
compensation, and the caveat is worded so as to be potentially
applicable only in determining if plaintiff is to enjoy the "higher
recovery,' ' the explicit wording of each and the implication of both
would seem to indicate that the caveat is not intended to have
applicability to our hypothetical. If that is the intent of the caveat,
we are left with rule (I)(A)'s application of State A's law, a result
contrary to that suggested by interest analysis and, at least arguably,
constitutionally suspect. However, if the caveat is intended to have

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Hague, 449 U.S. 302. See supra note 30.
Id. (italics added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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potential applicability in determining whether plaintiff may recover
as well as the extent of recovery, then the court would avoid the
applicability of State A's law and apply, instead, the law of State
B. But that avoidance would require a broader reading of the caveat
than its language would suggest. And as a condition precedent even
to recognizing the caveat's potential applicability, the court would
be required to engage in interest analysis as we did. Otherwise, how
could the court determine that both states would wish the plaintiff
to enjoy the "higher recovery ' 9 8 provided by the law of defendant's
state? If the court must utilize interest analysis to determine whether
rule (I)(A) or the caveat controls, the rule does little to simplify the
choice-of-law problem. Indeed, if the use of interest analysis is a
condition precedent to determining whether the rule or the caveat
applies (and I think it is), why should the court, having applied
interest analysis, even bother with the rule?
V.

DUTY TO WARN OF THE "UNKNOWABLE"

RISK

Plaintiff sues defendant manufacturer to recover for injuries sustained by the former as a result of the use of the latter's product.
The theory of liability is that the defendant's product was defective
and unreasonably dangerous because of defendant's failure to warn
of the risk that occasioned plaintiff's injuries. Defendant asserts that,
at the relevant times, it had no knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such a risk. Plaintiff does not controvert defendant's lack of knowledge, and defendant moves for summary judgment.
Plaintiff is domiciled in State A, defendant in State B. The action
is before the State A court. State A's local law imposes liability for
failure to warn of a risk that eventuates, irrespective of the defendant's actual or constructive knowledge.9 State B's local law imposes
no liability for failure to warn absent the defendant's actual or
constructive knowledge of the risk.1°° Defendant's motion for summary judgment asserts that State B's local law should apply. In
opposing the motion, plaintiff invokes State A's local law. The State
A court utilizes interest analysis.
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There would appear to be two reasons underlying State A's imposition of liability. First, State A believes that the imposition of
liability for failure to warn, irrespective of knowledge, will stimulate
manufacturers to expend more time, effort, and money in identifying
all risks incident to the use of their products. 10 Second, State A
wants to assure that its domiciliaries who are injured by such products
will not become indigent wards of the state. State A believes that as
between the "faultless" manufacturer and the injured victim, the
former should bear the economic loss.10 2 Since plaintiff is domiciled
in State A, the second reason for that state's law would convert into
a significant interest on the part of State A in having its law applied:
plaintiff is precisely within the class State A wishes to protect from
indigence. The first reason for State A's law, conduct regulation,
would convert into a significant interest on the part of that state in
having its law applied if the conduct intended to be regulated occurred
in State A, or the immediate consequences of that conduct occurred
in State A, or the ongoing consequences of that conduct would be
felt there. Because the injured victim is domiciled in State A, it
becomes obvious that the ongoing consequences will be felt in that
state. Let's assume, too, that the product injured the plaintiff in
State A, so that the immediate consequences of the conduct occurred
in that state. Clearly, State A has a significant interest in the
application of its local law imposing liability. The reason underlying
State B's local law which imposes no liability for failure to warn of
an unknown risk is a desire to protect the economic integrity of
"faultless" State B manufacturers. Because defendant is domiciled
in State B, that reason converts into a significant interest on the part
of State B in having its local law apply. Interest analysis indicates a
true conflict: each state has a significant interest in the application
of its own local law. Which state's interest is the more significant?
I believe that State A has the more significant interest, for two
reasons. First, that state's interest in conduct regulation, aimed at
protecting and preserving human life, would seem to be of greater
moment than State B's interest in protecting the economic integrity
of State B manufacturers. Second, State A's interest in assuring that
its domiciled victim does not become an indigent ward would seem
to be of greater significance than State B's interest in protecting the
economic integrity of its manufacturer. In the event of an adverse
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choice-of-law result, the injured victim's indigence seems more likely
to occur than the manufacturer's bankruptcy. Consequently, the State
A court would conclude that State A's local law should be applied
and that defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied.
Application of Professor Weintraub's rule would produce the same
result. Under rule (I)(A), "the law of plaintiff's habitual residence,"' 1 3 State A, would apply, assuming that the injury-producing
14
product is "available there through commercial channels." 0
Once again, let's see what happens if we transpose local laws.
Now it is State A's local law which would impose no liability for
failure to warn of the unknown risk and State B's local law which
would impose such liability. State A's local law exists to protect the
economic integrity of manufacturers domiciled in State A. Since
defendant is domiciled in State B, that reason would not justify the
application of State A's law. State B's local law exists to regulate
conduct and to assure that injured victims domiciled in State B do
not become indigent wards of that state. Since plaintiff is domiciled
in State A, the second reason would not create a State B interest.
The conduct regulating reason, however, would convert if the conduct
intended to be regulated occurred in State B, or the immediate
consequences of the conduct occurred in State B, or the ongoing
consequences of the conduct would be felt in State B. We have
already determined that the immediate consequences (plaintiff's injuries) occurred in State A and that the ongoing consequences would
be felt in State A (plaintiff's domicile). However, the conduct intended to be regulated, whether described as the decision (not) to
expend sufficient time, effort, and money to identify all risks or the
decision (not) to warn of the risk, would have occurred in State B,
the domicile of defendant, manufacturer. Therefore, State B would
have a significant interest in the application of its local law under
which liability is imposed for failure to warn of the unknown risk.
Interest analysis indicates a false conflict: only State B has a significant interest in the application of its local law.
Having concluded that State A has no significant interest in the
application of its own law, the court would be free to determine if
State A has a minimal interest in the litigation and, if so, how that
minimal interest would best be served, Because plaintiff is domiciled
in State A, that state does have a minimal interest in the litigation.
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Clearly, that minimal interest would be best served by the application
of the local law of State B which imposes liability. The State A
court, then, would apply State B's local law and deny defendant's
motion for summary judgment.
Professor Weintraub's rule, on the other hand, would seem to
continue to apply State A's local law because that state is "plaintiff's
habitual residence" 15 and defendant's injury-producing product is
"available there through commercial channels."' 1 The rule's application would seem to be immutable, notwithstanding the transposition
of the local laws and the resulting conclusions that State A has no
significant interest in the application of its own local law and that
State A's minimal interest in the litigation is best served by the
application of State B's local law. The rule's apparent result, application of State A's local law and the granting of defendant's motion
for summary judgment, would appear to be contrary to the result
suggested by interest analysis and constitutionally suspect under Ha107
gue.
Once more, however, we should attempt to determine if the caveat
overrules the rule. The caveat would apply the law of defendant's
state (State B) if "both defendant's and plaintiff's states wish plaintiff
to have the advantage of the higher recovery." 108 Once again, we are
confronted with a problem of interpretation. Since our hypothetical
presents the issue of "whether plaintiff will be compensated"'09 and
not an issue of "the extent of compensation,"1 0 and since the caveat's
language applies only to an issue "of the higher recovery,"'' the
caveat would appear to be inapplicable, and the court would be left
with rule (I)(A)'s awkward application of the law of State A. To
avoid this awkward conclusion, it is necessary to interpret the language of the caveat beyond its apparent meaning. Once again, the
court could determine the potential applicability of the caveat only
after utilizing interest analysis. That would do little to simplify the
choice-of-law process.
VI.

MARKET SHaRE LIABILITY

Plaintiff, domiciled in State A, developed cancer, allegedly as a
result of her mother's ingestion of diethylstilbestrol (DES) during the
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508. (italics added).
Id.
Id.
Id.

1988]

CHOICE-OF-LAW

mother's pregnancy with plaintiff. To recover for her injury, plaintiff
sues five pharmaceutical houses which manufactured and distributed
DES at the relevant time and place. Although some 200 drug companies manufactured and distributed DES at the relevant time and
place, of that total, only the five defendants continue in business
and are vulnerable to jurisdiction in State A, the forum. The five
defendants produced approximately 90 percent of the total DES
marketed. Plaintiff's mother used the DES in State A. Neither the
prescribing physician nor the pharmacist is able to identify the
manufacturer of the DES taken by plaintiff's mother, because of the
passage of time. Plaintiff alleges that the DES taken by her mother
was defective and unreasonably dangerous because of the absence of
a warning that it could cause cancer in a child born after ingestion
of the drug by the mother. 1 2 Defendants move for summary judgment
(or partial summary judgment) because of plaintiff's failure to allege
and offer proof that any one of the five defendants manufactured
the DES actually taken by plaintiff's mother. State A has embraced
the market share theory of liability under which the plaintiff's
complaint (and other papers) would be legally sufficient. Under State
A's local law, the plaintiff would have a right to recover full
compensatory damages from the five defendants unless one or more
of the defendants carries the burden of persuading the jury that it
or they did not manufacture the DES taken by plaintiff's mother." 3
In the event of such a recovery, plaintiff's full compensatory damages
would be apportioned among the liable defendants in the same
proportion in which each had a share of the appropriate market.
State B, domicile of three of the five defendants, has rejected the
concept of market share liability. Under State B's local law, absent
an allegation and preliminary proof (by affidavit or deposition, for
example) that defendants had manufactured the DES taken by plaintiff's mother, the cause of action would not be legally sufficient and
4
defendants' motions for summary judgment would be granted."
State C, domicile of two of the defendants, has adopted a modified
form of market share liability. Under State C's local law, plaintiff

112. The hypothetical in the text is based on Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
113. Sindell, supra note 112.
114. Cf., Pipon v. Burroughs-Welcome Co., 532 F. Supp. 637 (D.N.J. 1982);
Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1985); Thompson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984)(applying
Louisiana law); Griffin v. Tenneco Resins, Inc. 648 F. Supp. 964 (W.D. N.C. 1986).
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would be permitted a partial recovery of compensatory damages from
those defendants unable to prove that they had not manufactured
the DES used by the plaintiff's mother. State C's local law would
permit the plaintiff to recover from those defendants that portion of
compensatory damages that equals their portion of the total relevant
market. If those defendants had enjoyed 90 percent of the relevant
market, the plaintiff could recover 90 percent of her compensatory
damages, with each defendant contributing damages equal to its
proportionate share of the relevant market." 5 Under State C's local
law, partial summary judgment for that portion of plaintiff's compensatory damages greater than the total share of the relevant market
would be entered in favor of defendants.
In ruling on the defendants' motions, the State A court would
resolve the choice-of-law problems through interest analysis. The
court would first rule on the motions for summary judgment filed
by the three defendants domiciled in State B. Obviously, the first
step of that analysis would require the court to identify the reasons
underlying the conflicting local laws of State A and State B.
In part, State A's local law permitting the plaintiff a full recovery
from those defendants unable to prove that they did not manufacture
the DES exists to assure that victims domiciled in State A do not
become indigent wards of that state. Since the plaintiff is domiciled
in State A, she is encompassed within the class of persons thus
intended to be protected. Consequently, the first reason for State
A's local law would convert into a significant interest on the part of
that state in having its law applied. The second reason for State A's
local law is conduct regulation. State A believes that imposing such
market share liability will deter manufacturers from marketing defective products. This conduct regulating reason converts into a
significant interest on the part of State A in having its local law
applied if the conduct intended to be regulated occurred in State A,
or the immediate consequences of that conduct occurred in State A,
or the ongoing consequences of that conduct would be felt there.
The immediate consequences, whether defined as plaintiff's mother's
use of the DES or plaintiff's cancer, occurred in State A. Moreover,
the ongoing consequences will be felt in State A, plaintiff's domicile.
As for the conduct itself, it could be said to have occurred in part
in State B, where the three defendants failed to supply an appropriate
warning with their product, and in part in State A, where plaintiff's
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mother received and used the product. Clearly, the second reason
for State A's local law converts into a significant interest on the part
of that state in having its law applied.
The reason underlying State B's local law rejecting market share
liability is to protect the economic integrity of State B defendants
whose conduct has not been shown to be a cause in fact of plaintiff's
injuries. Since the three defendants are domiciled in State B, they
fall precisely within the class thus intended to be protected by that
state's law. Consequently, State B has a significant interest in the
application of its local law.
Which of these competing interests is the more significant? I believe
the court would find State A's interest to be the more significant for
two reasons. First, that state's interest in conduct regulation, aimed
at protecting and preserving human life, seems to be of greater
moment than State B's admittedly legitimate interest in protecting
the economic integrity of State C manufacturers. Second, as between
State A's interest in protecting the economic integrity of its injured
victim and State B's interest in protecting the economic integrity of
its manufacturers, the former interest seems more significant. In the
event of an adverse choice-of-law result, the indigence of the injured
victim seems more likely than the bankruptcy of the commercial
manufacturers. Consequently, I believe interest analysis would lead
the State A court to apply State A's local law and deny the motions
for summary judgment of the three State B defendants. What result
would Professor Weintraub's rule produce? Under rule (I)(A), a
similar result would be achieved; "the law of plaintiff's habitual
residence ' 116 would be applied.
But what happens if we transpose the local laws of State A and
State B? State A's local law rejecting market share liability would
exist to protect the economic integrity of manufacturers domiciled in
that state. Since none of the defendants is domiciled in State A, that
reason would not convert into a significant interest on the part of
State A in having its local law applied. State B's local law which
adopts market share liability exists, in part, to assure that injured
victims domiciled in that state do not become indigent wards of State
B. Since plaintiff is domiciled in State A, that reason would not
convert. Another reason for State B's local law would be conduct
regulation. Since the conduct intended to be regulated occurred in
part in State B where defendants failed to supply an adequate warning

116.

Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.

DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:559

with their product, that reason would convert. Thus, interest analysis
would indicate a false conflict: only State B has a significant interest
in having its local law applied. Since State A does not have a
significant interest in the application of its own local law, the court
would be free to inquire as to whether State A has a minimal interest
in the litigation and, if so, how that minimal interest would best be
served. Because plaintiff is domiciled there, State A would have a
minimal interest in the litigation which would best be served by the
application of State B's local law permitting the plaintiff a recovery.
Consequently, the State A court would apply State B's local law and
deny the motions for summary judgment.
What result would be produced by Professor Weintraub's rule?
The answer isn't entirely clear. On the surface, rule (I)(A) would still
seem to apply and the law of State A, "plaintiff's habitual residence, ' " 7 would be applied. That result would be contrary to the
result produced by interest analysis and, because State A has no
interest in the application of its own law, would be constitutionally
suspect under Hague."8 But how about Professor Weintraub's caveat?
"If ... both defendant's and plaintiff's states wish plaintiff to have
the advantage of the higher recovery available under defendant's law,
then that is the law that should be applied.""19 Again, we have a
problem of interpretation. Rule (I)(A) applies both to "whether
plaintiff will be compensated," 120 (the issue presented in our hypothetical), and to "the extent of compensation,' ' 2 (an issue not
presented). The caveat applies only to those cases where both states
would wish the plaintiff to have "the higher recovery.' ' 2 2 If the
caveat applies only to cases where the extent of recovery is at issue,
the apparent intent of the language, it would not apply to our
hypothetical and we would be left with a result which is inconsistent
with the result of interest analysis and constitutionally suspect. If the
caveat were deemed applicable, that awkward result would be avoided
but only after the court had utilized interest analysis and then
determined that the caveat, rather than the rule, governed.
Now let's return the local laws to their original states and consider
the motions for partial summary judgment filed by the two State C
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defendants. State A's local law accepts market share liability for the
two reasons already noted: (1) to assure that the injured victim does
not become an indigent ward of that state, and (2) to regulate
conduct. As we have seen, both of those reasons convert into a
significant interest on the part of State A in having its local law
applied. State C's local law accepts a modified form of market share
liability which permits plaintiff to recover that portion of compensatory damages equal to defendants' share of the relevant market.
What are the reasons underlying State C's law? To the extent that
State C recognizes even a modified form of market share liability,
its local law would be predicated on (1) assuring that State C injured
victims do not become indigent wards of that state, and (2) conduct
regulation. Because plaintiff is domiciled in State A, not State C,
the first reason would not convert. However, because the conduct
intended to be regulated occurred in part in State C where the two
defendants failed to supply an appropriate warning with their product, that conduct regulating reason would convert. But why only
partial recovery of compensatory damages limited to the same proportion in which defendants enjoyed a share of the relevant market?
Presumably, the reason for this aspect of State C's law is to avoid
a "distortion" of liability, that is, a liability greater than the total
12
share of the releynt market enjoyed by the State C manufacturers. 1
Since the two defendants seeking partial summary judgment are State
C domiciliaries, that reason for State C's local law would convert.
Interest analysis indicates a true conflict: both State A and State C
have significant interests in the application of their own local laws.
Yet, it is a limited true conflict. State A is concerned with the
economic integrity of its domiciled injured victim and with conduct
regulation. State B is concerned with the economic integrity of its
domiciled manufacturers and with conduct regulation. To the extent
that the local laws of both states are aimed at conduct regulation, it
might be asserted that no conflict exists. Still, State C's interest in
conduct regulation is tempered with an interest in protecting the
economic integrity of its manufacturers by limiting recovery of compensatory damages to the extent that State C manufacturers enjoyed
a share of the total relevant market. State A's interest in conduct
regulation is not so limited.
This might suggest that application of State A's local law permitting
complete recovery of compensatory damages would more effectively
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accomplish the desired conduct regulation than would application of
State C's local law which would permit only partial recovery. Consequently, State A's law would more effectively accomplish the
mutual interest of both states in conduct regulation. That suggestion,
however, overlooks State C's tempering consideration: preserving the
economic integrity of its manufacturers. If State C's law were applied,
there would be some furthering of both states' interest in conduct
regulation while, at the same time, there would be no frustration of
State C's interest in the economic integrity of its manufacturers.
Moreover, application of State C's law permitting partial recovery
of compensatory damages would provide some (limited) assurance
that the State A plaintiff would not become an indigent ward of
that state. 124 In sum, application of State C's law permitting partial
recovery would seem to frustrate State A's interest less than the
application of State A's law would frustrate State C's interest. That
would lead me, and perhaps the State A court, to conclude that
State C has the more significant interest in the application of its
local law permitting partial recovery and, therefore, to grant the
partial summary judgment sought by the two State C defendants.
What law would be applied by Professor Weintraub's rule? Rule
1 25
(I)(A) would "[a]pply the law of plaintiff's habitual residence,'
State A, "[tlo determine . . . the extent of compensation for actual
damages.' ' 26 Obviously, that result would be constitutionally permissible, given State A's significant interest in the application of its
local law, and, indeed, it's quite possible that a State A court might
conclude (contrary to my own conclusion) that State A had the more
significant interest in the application of its law. Still, mechanical
resolution of the choice-of-law problem through rule (I)(A) would
do nothing to alert the court to the fact that, with regard to conduct
regulation, both states had an interest, and that, ultimately, application of State C's law might frustrate State A's interest less than
the application of State-A's law would frustrate State C's interest.
The price the court would pay for the ease of resolution provided
by rule (I)(A) would be nonrecognition of relevant factors that
conceivably could have led the court to a different result through
interest analysis.
124. Moreover, since the court had earlier concluded that plaintiff might enjoy
recovery of full compensatory damages from the State B defendants pursuant to
the local law of State A, limiting the amount of recovery from the State C defendants
is not likely to expose the plaintiff to indigence.
125. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
126. Id.
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Let's transpose the local laws of State A and State C. Now it is
State A which permits only partial recovery and State C which
permits full recovery. The reasons underlying State A's law would
be to protect the economic integrity of State A manufacturers and
to regulate conduct. Since the two defendants seeking partial summary judgment are domiciled in State C, not State A, the first reason
would not convert. However, since part of the conduct intended to
be regulated occurred in State A and the immediate and ongoing
consequences of that conduct also were ielt in State A, that state
has a significant interest in the application of its local law permitting
partial recovery. The reasons underlying State C's local law permitting
full recovery would be to assure that victims domiciled in that state
did not become indigent wards of that state and to regulate conduct.
Since the victim is domiciled in State A, not State C, the first reason
would not convert. However, since the conduct intended to be
regulated occurred in part in State C, the second reason would
convert. Interest analysis suggests a true conflict; each state has a
significant interest in the application of its local law. But wait. Is it
really a conflict? State A's concern with protecting the economic
integrity of that state's domiciled manufacturers (thus permitting only
partial recovery) does not convert. The only aspect of State A's
concerns that converted into a significant interest in the application
of its local law was conduct regulation. That same interest underlies
State C's law permitting full recovery. Presumably, State C's law
permitting a full recovery would more efficiently serve the mutual
interest of both states in conduct regulation. And, since no State A
defendant is involved, State A's tempering consideration simply would
not apply. Apparently, State C's law permitting full recovery would
best serve the interests of both states. The State A court, recognizing
that, would apply State C's local law and deny the defendants'
motions for partial summary judgment.
How about Professor Weintraub's rule? Rule (I)(A), if applicable,
would "[aipply the law of plaintiff's habitual residence,' '1 27 State A,
"[tlo determine ... the extent of compensation for actual damages,' 1 28 and therefore defendants' motions for partial summary
judgment would be granted. Does Professor Weintraub's caveat
apply? The caveat states that, "If, as may sometimes occur, both
defendant's and plaintiff's states wish plaintiff to have the advantage
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of the higher recovery under defendant's law, then that is the law
that should be applied."' 129 Our current hypothetical does go to the
extent of compensation. Here, it is "defendant's law,"' 130 the law of
State C, which provides the higher recovery. Our analysis has suggested that both State A and State C might "wish plaintiff to have
the advantage of [that] higher recovery."'' Apparently, the caveat
would overrule rule (I)(A) and would point to the same result we
achieved through interest analysis. But how would the State A court
know that both states would "wish plaintiff to have the advantage
of the higher recovery available under defendant's law"' 13 2 without
utilizing interest analysis, as we did? I don't know. Professor Weintraub's caveat would seem to require the court to employ interest
analysis for the purpose of determining whether rule (I)(A) or the
caveat, each of which produce a different result, applies. If that's
the case (and I think it is), the rule doesn't do much to simplify the
choice-of-law process. If the rule would require interest analysis as
a condition precedent to determining if (I)(A) or the caveat applies,
why would the court not simply apply the law indicated by interest
analysis and skip the rule and its caveat?
VII.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Plaintiff, a State A domiciliary, brings a product liability action
against defendant, a State B corporation, in a State A court. Defendant moves to dismiss the action as time-barred. The action was
initiated more than two but less than three years after the cause of
action had accrued. The potentially applicable statute of limitations
of State A requires the action to be initiated within three years of
accrual. The potentially applicable limitations statute of State B
requires that the action be initiated within two years of accrual.
Defendant's motion to dismiss asserts the applicability of State B's
statute. Plaintiff's opposition to the motion rests on State A's statute.
The State A court, using interest analysis,"' might conclude that
both states' limitations statutes have similar underlying reasons. One
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133. Some of those states which utilize an interest analysis approach to resolve
choice-of-law problems generally have employed that methodology to resolve statute
of limitations choice-of-law problems. See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J.
130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Tornlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981)(applying
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of those reasons would be to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process by eliminating actions founded on stale evidence. A second
reason would be to protect the economic integrity of the defendant
by assuring that he will not be compelled to defend an action resting
on stale evidence when it may be difficult to generate defensive
evidence because of the passage of time. The third reason would be
to afford the potential defendant a period of repose. One who
contemplates the possibility of being sued should not be required to
live under that cloud indefinitely. At some point, he should be able
to say with some confidence, "If he hasn't sued me by now, he isn't
going to sue me-at least, not successfully." With regard to the first
reason, State A as the forum state would have a significant interest
in applying its own statute of limitations. Apparently, St:.te A has
concluded that there is no significant threat to the integrity of its
judicial process if such actions are brought within three years of
accrual. Since no court of State B is involved, that state's concern
with preserving the integrity of its judicial process would not convert
into a significant interest in having its statute of limitations applied.
The second reason, protecting the economic integrity of the defendant, would convert into a significant interest on the part of State
B, defendant's domicile, in having its two-year limitations period
apply, but not on the part of State A. Similarly, the third reason,
affording the defendant a time of repose, would convert into a
significant interest on the part of State B in having its statute applied,
but not on the part of State A. Thus, each state would have a
significant interest in the application of its own statute of limitations.
Which state's interest is the more significant? I would be inclined to
think that the State A court would find State B's interest the more
significant, apply State B's two-year statute, and grant defendant's
motion to dismiss. I believe State A would recognize that, while
entertaining the action would pose no threat to the integrity of its
judicial process (as evidenced by its three-year statute), permitting
the action to proceed would frustrate both of State B's significant

Washington law); Dindo v. Whitney, 429 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying New
Hampshire law). Compare Cornnwell v. CIT Corp. of New York, 373 F. Supp. 661
(D.D.C. 1974) (Richey, J., predicting that District of Columbia, which uses interest
analysis, would employ that approach to resolve limitations choice-of-law problem)
with Manatee Cablevision Corp. v. Pierson, 433 F. Supp. 571 (D.D.C. 1977) (Richey,
J., predicting that District of Colummbia would retain traditional approach of
labeling limitations issue procedural and would apply forum's statute). Manatee
proved to be the more accurate prediction. See Hodge v. Southern Railway Co.,
415 A.2d 543 (D.C. 1980).
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interests. Those interests of State B in protecting its domiciled defendant seem to be of greater moment that State A's permissive view
of the more than two-year-old action.
But would State A be inclined to apply its own longer statute in
light of the fact that the plaintiff is domiciled in State A? I think
the court should resist any such inclination as this would suggest
that State A's three-year statute was intended to benefit plaintiffs
domiciled in that state. I believe this suggestion is not persuasive. A
statute of limitations, almost by definition, is intended to protect
judicial integrity and defendants. It is not intended as a plaintifffavoring law. Therefore, I think the court should apply State B's
statute and grant defendant's motion to dismiss, despite plaintiff's
34
domicile in State A.
What result would Professor Weintraub's rule produce? Assuming
that the issue goes to "whether plaintiff will be compensated' '1 35 and
that "the product that caused the harm [is]. . . available [in State
A] through commercial channels,' 1 36 rule (I)(A) would "[aipply the
law of plaintiff's habitual residence,' ' 37 State A, and defendant's
motion to dismiss would be denied. Obviously, that result would be
constitutionally permissible under Hague.38 Moreover, application of
State A's law would be entirely consistent with the traditional lex
fori resolution of choice-of-law problems dealing with statutes of
limitations. (Because the forum would have an interest in applying
its own statute in terms of preserving the integrity of its own judicial
process, that traditional lex fori resolution would continue to be
constitutionally permissible.) But Professor Weintraub himself has
suggested that "[s]tatutes of limitations... should always be treated
as substantive for conflicts purposes and subjected to complete

functional choice-of-law analysis.

''

3

Whether Professor Weintraub

would achieve the same conclusion through interest analysis as I have
imputed to the State A court I do not know. I do know, however,
that if the State A court were to apply rule (I)(A), it would arrive
at a result different from that which I have imposed on the court

134. To prevent undue surprise to the State A plaintiff who may have relied
on the application of that state's statute of limitations, the court, assuming this to
be a departure from prior law, could make its determination applicable prospectively
only.
135. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Hague, 449 U.S. 302. See supra note 30.
139. Commentary, supra note 5, at 59 (footnotes omitted).
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and, presumably, without considering the factors which led to that
result.
Let's transpose the laws. Now State A has the two-year statute
and State B maintains the three-year statute. Since State A remains
the forum, it would continue to have a significant interest in the
application of its own statute for the purpose of preserving the
integrity of the judicial process in that state. Entertaining this action,
however, would have an adverse effect on the integrity of the judicial
process in State A. That state's two-year statute evidences a conclusion that when such actions are more than two years old, the integrity
of State A's courts is threatened. Because State B, defendant's
domicile, would have a significant interest in protecting the economic
integrity of defendant and in affording him a time of repose, interest
analysis suggests a true conflict. State A's interest in protecting the
integrity of its judicial process would point to the application of
State A's two-year statute and the granting of defendant's motion
to dismiss. State B's interest in protecting its defendant's economic
integrity and in affording him an appropriate time of repose would
not be frustrated by denying the motion to dismiss and permitting
the action to proceed, given State B's three-year statute. Which
state's limitations period should the State A court apply? I think the
court would conclude that the threat to its own integrity required
the application of State A's two-year statute and the granting of the
defendant's motion to dismiss. I believe the State A court would
find the rather emphatic "Thou shalt not" implied by its shorter
limitations period more significant than the permissive "Thou may"
implied by State B's longer limitations period. Of course, Professor
Weintraub's rule (I)(A) would produce the same result, assuming that
the issue goes to "whether plaintiff will be compensated"'' 4 and that
"the product that caused the harm [is] . . . available [in State A]
through commercial channels.' ' 4 1 However, the very fact that rule
(I)(A) would lead to the application of State A's statute of limitations,
whether that were the longer or the shorter of the two statutes,
suggests that the rule may not be entirely sensitive to the factors
significant to an interest analysis resolution.
Let's return the local laws to their original states. State A has the
three-year statute and State B the two-year statute. But let's transpose
the litigants' domiciles. Plaintiff is domiciled in State B and defendant

140.
141.

Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
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in State A. State A remains the forum. State A's concern with
protecting the integrity of the judicial process in that state would
convert into a significant interest on the part of State A in applying
its three-year statute. Moreover, State A's concern with protecting
the economic integrity of its domiciled defendants and in affording
them an appropriate period of repose would convert into significant
interest on the part of State A in applying its own statute because
defendant is domiciled in State A. State B, being neither forum nor
defendant's domicile, would seem to have no significant interest in
applying its statute of limitations. Having concluded that State B has
no significant interest in the application of its own statute, we are
now free to determine if State B has a minimal interest in the
litigation and, if so, how that minimal interest would best be served.
As plaintiff's domicile, State B would seem to have a minimal interest
in the litigation best served by the application of State A's threeyear statute. Interest analysis demonstrates a false conflict: only State
A has a significant interest in the application of its own statute.
Moreover, State B's minimal interest in the litigation is best served
by the application of State A's statute. Consequently, the court in
State A would apply its three-year statute and deny defendant's
motion to dismiss.
What result would be generated by Professor Weintraub's rule?
Assuming that the issue is "whether plaintiff will be compensated"1 42
and that "the product that caused the harm or products of the same
type are available [in plaintiff's habitual residence, State B,] through
commercial channels and the defendant should have foreseen this
availability,"' 43 rule (I)(A) would point to the local law of "plaintiff's
habitual residence,"' 1" State B. Under State B's two-year statute, the
defendant's motion to dismiss would be granted. That result would
be contrary to the conclusion achieved through interest analysis and
would be constitutionally suspect under Hague.145
Would the court be able to decide this issue using Professor
Weintraub's caveat which provides: "If, as may sometimes occur,
both defendant's and plaintiff's states wish plaintiff to have the
advantage of the higher recovery available under defendant's law,
then that is the law that should be applied."' Given the italicized

142.

Id.

143.

Id.

144.
.145.
146.

Id.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302. See supra note 30.
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phrase, it is not entirely clear whether the caveat, by its own terms,
is intended to apply to the question of plaintiff's right to
compensation' 47 (the issue in our hypothetical), as opposed to the
question of whether plaintiff should "have the advantage of the
higher recovery."'" The literal language of the caveat would suggest
that it is not applicable to our case. This suggestion would seem to
be corroborated by the fact that rule (I) refers to "whether plaintiff
will be compensated and the extent of the compensation."'' 49 The
fact that rule (I) refers both to whether or not compensation will be
available and to the extent of compensation, and that the caveat's
language refers only to "the higher recovery,"' 50 would indicate that
the caveat is inapplicable to our hypothetical. In those circumstances,
we would be left with the awkward and constitutionally suspect result
produced by rule (I)(A): application of State B's two-year statute
and the granting of defendant's motion to dismiss.
But suppose we assume that the caveat is applicable to our hypothetical. What happens then? The caveat would apply the plaintifffavoring law if "both defendant's and plaintiff's states"'' would so
desire. We have concluded that State A, defendant's state, would
have a significant interest in applying its three-year statute and State
B, plaintiff's state, would have no significant interest in applying its
two-year statute. Moreover, we have concluded that State B's minimal
interest in the litigation, arising out of plaintiff's domicile in that
state, would best be served by the application of State A's threeyear statute. Still, there remains a problem. Is State A's three-year
statute truly a plaintiff-favoring law? As indicated earlier, I find it
difficult to characterize any statute of limitations as plaintiff-favoring. Therefore, I would be inclined to find the caveat inapplicable
to this situation and would be left with the awkward result produced
by rule (I)(A). To one willing to characterize the three-year statute
as plaintiff-favoring, the caveat would be considered applicable, State
A's three-year statutewould apply, and the result would be constitutionally acceptable and wholly consistent with the result produced
by interest analysis. Of course, as noted earlier, the court could
determine the potential applicability of the caveat only after engaging

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:559.

in interest analysis, which would seem to eliminate the greater facility
purportedly achieved under the rule.
Let's fashion a different sort of limitations problem. Plaintiff, a
State A domiciliary, brings a product liability action against defendant, a State B domiciliary, in the State A court. One theory of
liability asserted is breach of implied warranty of merchantability
under section 2-314152 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the "Code").
Plaintiff's action is more than two years old if accrual is measured
from the time of injury; the action is less than four years old if
accrual is measured from the time of sale by defendant. The general
personal injury statute of limitations of each state is two years. Each
state has adopted the Code and section 2-72513 which provides a
four-year limitations period beginning with the date of sale. The
highest appellate court of State A has held that the four-year limitation period of section 2-725 applies 5 4 where the plaintiff asserts
liability under section 2-314 of the Code. The highest appellate court
of State B has held that the general two-year statute of limitations
applies to personal injury actions1" regardless of whether plaintiff
asserts liability under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts or section 2-314 of the Code. Relying on the local law of State
B, defendant moves to dismiss the action as time-barred. Plaintiff
opposes the motion, asserting that the local law of State A should
be applied. The State A court utilizes interest analysis.
If we were to treat this choice-of-law problem as we treated the
earlier limitations problems, we would assign the same reasons to
each state's local law: (1) to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process; (2) to protect the economic integrity of the defendant; and,
(3) to afford defendant a time of repose. With regard to State A the
forum, the first reason would convert into a significant interest in
the application of its four-year limitations period. With regard to
State B, defendant's domicile, the second and third reasons would
convert into significant interests in the application of its two-year
limitations period. For the reasons noted earlier, the State A court
might conclude that State B had the more significant interest in the
application of its local law and, for that reason, grant defendant's
motion to dismiss.
152.
153.

U.C.C. § 2-314(1977).
U.C.C. § 2-725(1977).

154. See, e.g., Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 502 Pa. 557, 467 A.2d 811
(1983).
155. See, e.g., Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1980).
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But this problem is distinguishable from the earlier limitations
hypothetical. In this problem, the highest appellate court of State A
has held that if plaintiff asserts a section 402A tort claim that state's
two-year statute applies, but if plaintiff asserts section 2-314 that
state's four-year statute under section 2-725 applies.' 5 6 This determination is a plaintiff-favoring conclusion. It gives plaintiff the
option of invoking the two-year statute by asserting a tort claim or
the four-year statute by asserting a Code claim. The apparent reason
underlying State A's determination to afford the product liability
plaintiff that option is to diminish the likelihood that plaintiff's
action will be time-barred and thereby diminish the likelihood that
the injured plaintiff will become an indigent ward of the' state. Since
plaintiff is domiciled in State A, the reasons underlying that state's
local statute of limitations option would convert into a significant.
interest on the part of State A in having its law applied.
State B, on the other hand, has concluded that whether plaintiff
asserts section 402A or section 2-314, the two-year statute applies.
State B has opted to achieve symmetry in product liability actions
irrespective of the label selected by the plaintiff. Put another way,
State B has concluded that the reasons underlying its general twoyear statute of limitations may not be circumvented by a product
liability plaintiff seeking to recover damages for personal injuries
simply by the invocation of section 2-314. In our hypothetical, two
of those reasons, protecting the economic integrity of the State B
defendant and affording the State B defendant a period of repose,
convert into significant interests on the part of State B in having its
local law applied.
Our hypothetical presents a true conflict in that each state has a
significant interest in the application of its own local law. As the
forum, State A has the right to determine that hearing this action
will not jeopardize the integrity of the state's judicial process and,
therefore, has an interest in having its four-year statute applied. As
plaintiff's domicile, State A is also interested in assuring that plaintiff
does not become an indigent ward of the state. On the other hand,
State B, as defendant's domicile, has an interest in having its twoyear statute applied to protect the economic integrity of the defendant
and to provide the defendant with a time of repose. I am inclined
to think that the State A court would find State A's interest to be
the more significant. The likelihood of the injured plaintiff's becom-
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ing an indigent ward of the state if denied the opportunity of any
recovery is sufficiently great so as to outweigh State B's legitimate
interest in protecting the defendant from bankruptcy and affording
defendant the relief of repose. Consequently, I believe that the State
A court would deny defendant's motion to dismiss.
Professor Weintraub's rule would produce the same result. Since
the issue goes to "whether plaintiff will be compensated"' 5 7 and,
assuming that defendant's product is available in State A through
commercial channels, the rule would "[a]pply the law of plaintiff's
habitual residence,"'5 State A.
Now, let's transpose domiciles. With the plaintiff domiciled in
State B, State A's interest in assuring that the injured victim does
not become an indigent ward of that state would no longer exist.
State A's interest in applying its four-year statute would rest exclusively on State A's being the forum and its belief that hearing this
action would not threaten the integrity of the judicial process in that
state. With the defendant domiciled in State A, State B's interest in
protecting the defendant's economic integrity and in assuring the
defendant a time of repose would no longer exist. Since the action
is being heard in State A, State B's concern with protecting the
integrity of the judicial process in that state would be irrelevant.
Apparently, State B would not have a significant interest in the
application of its two-year statute. State A, as the forum, would
have a significant interest in the application of its four-year statute.
The case presents a false conflict; only State A has a significant
interest in the application of its own local law. Since State B has no
significant interest in the application of its own local law, the State
A forum would be free to determine if State B has a minimal interest
in the litigation and, if so, how that minimal interest would best be
served. Since the plaintiff is domiciled in State B, State B does have
a minimal interest in the litigation and, clearly, that minimal interest
is best served by the application of State A's local law-the fouryear statute. Consequently, the State A court would apply its own
local law and deny defendant's motion to dismiss.
How about Professor Weintraub's rule? Since the issue goes to
"whether plaintiff will be compensated"' 5 9 and, assuming that defendant's product "or products of the same type are available [in

157.
158.

Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
Id.

159.

Id.

19881

CHOICE-OF-LAW

plaintiff's habitual residence, State B,] through commercial channels
and the defendant should have foreseen this availability,"'' 1 rule
16
(I)(A) would "[a]pply the law of plaintiff's habitual residence,' '
State B, and defendant's motion to dismiss would be granted. That
result would be contrary to the result we achieved through interest
analysis and, given our conclusion that State B has no significant
interest in having its local law applied, that result would be constitutionally suspect under Hague. 62
Would Professor Weintraub's caveat negate the applicability of
rule (I)(A)? Once again, we are confronted with the ambiguity created
by the language of rule (I)(A) and the language of the caveat. The
rule has potential applicability if the issue goes to "whether plaintiff
will be compensated" 1 6 (the issue in our hypothetical) or "the extent
of compensation"' 64 (an issue not presented by our hypothetical).
The caveat has potential applicability if "both defendant's and
plaintiff's states wish plaintiff to have the advantage of the higher
recovery available under defendant's law.' '165 If the language of the
caveat is read literally and in the manner suggested by the language
of rule (I)(A), the caveat would not be applicable to our hypothetical
which presents no issue as to the extent of liability. In that case, we
would be left with the result produced by rule (I)(A), a result which
is inconsistent with the result produced by interest analysis and
constitutionally suspect under Hague'6. If we extend the language of
the caveat beyond its apparent intended applicability, and, in that
manner, apply it to our hypothetical, we would achieve a result
consistent with our interest analysis result, the applicability of State
A's law and the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. But, once
again, we (and no less the court) could determine even the potential
applicability of the caveat only by utilizing interest analysis. A rule
that requires interest analysis in order to determine if the rule or its
caveat applies hardly does much to simplify the choice-of-law process.
VIII.

Loss

OF CONSORTIUM-DERIVATIVE

OR INDEPENDENT

Plaintiff wife, domiciled in State A, sues product manufacturer,
domiciled in State B, in a State A court. Plaintiff seeks to recover
160.
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damages for the loss of consortium she sustained as the result of
physical injuries suffered by her husband as the result of his use of
defendant's product. Defendant moves for summary judgment, based
on an earlier judgment for defendant in a product liability action
brought by the husband. 167 Under the local law of State B, a
consortium claim is characterized as derivative 6 and the earlier
judgment for the defendant manufacturer would estop the plaintiff
from maintaining the present product liability action. 6 9 Defendant's
motion is based on the applicability of State B's local law. Plaintiff's
opposition to the motion for summary judgment is based on State
A's local law which characterizes consortium actions as independent; 70 thus, under State A law, the earlier judgment for the defendant
would not estop the plaintiff from maintaining the consortium action.
Let's assume that the earlier judgment for the defendant was entered
in a State A court.
How should the court in State A respond to defendant's motion
for summary judgment? I suppose the court could conclude that
whether or not estoppel by judgment, resulting from an earlier State
A proceeding and asserted in a current State A proceeding, applied
is a matter to be determined exclusively by State A law. In that case,
the court presumably would conclude that, since State A characterizes
consortium actions as independent, the current plaintiff is not estopped by the earlier judgment for defendant. But that parochial
reaction would overlook the existence of any interest State B might
have in the application of its law which treats consortium actions as
derivative. Let's assume that the State A court recognizes the potential
choice-of-law problem and utilizes interest analysis to resolve it.
What are the concerns underlying State A's local law characterizing
the consortium action as independent? Perhaps State A believes that
it would be inequitable to the spouse who sustained a loss of
consortium to make her claim dependent on the success of her
husband's personal injury action. State A may feel that the spouse

167. The hypothetical is based on Stickney v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 377
F. Supp. 785 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
168. See, e.g., Stickney v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. supra note 167 (applying
Florida law); Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1979); Scattaregia v. Shin
Shen Wu, 343 Pa. Super. 452, 495 A.2d 552 (1985).
169. See Stickney v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., supra note 167.
170. See, e.g., Macon v. Seaward Construction Co., Inc., 555 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1977) (applying New Hampshire law); Brann v. Exeter Clinic, Inc., 127 N.H. 155,
498 A.2d 334 (1985); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 421 N.E.2d 67
(1981).
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who sustained a loss of consortium should have her own day in
court, thus assuring that her claim for damages is not "clouded" by
any infirmities afflicting husband's personal injury action. In short,
State A wishes to preserve the economic integrity of spouses domiciled
in that state who suffer a loss of consortium. Since plaintiff wife is
domiciled in State A, this reason would convert into a significant
interest on the part of State A in having its law applied.
What are the concerns underlying State B's local law which characterizes consortium actions as derivative? Presumably, one reason
for that law would be to protect the economic integrity of defendants
domiciled in that state by affording them an enhanced opportunity
of avoiding liability for consortium claims. Moreover, State B may
be desirous of protecting its domiciled defendants from "duplicative"
litigation expenses. That, too, would go toward protecting the economic integrity of defendants domiciled in State B. Since defendant
is domiciled in State B, those reasons would convert into a significant
interest on the part of State B in having its law applied.
Which state's interest is the more significant? I find that question
a rather close one. We have already concluded that protecting the
victim from indigence was of greater moment than protecting the
commercial defendant from bankruptcy. Here, however, it seems
unlikely that plaintiff will be confronted with indigence as a result
of the failure of her consortium claim. Typically, no matter how
significant the loss of consortium may be, the plaintiff, not having
been physically injured, is not likely to have suffered a substantial
diminution of her capacity to be self-supporting. Therefore, denying
plaintiff's consortium claim, although having an adverse effect on
her economic integrity, is not likely to result in her indigence.
Assuming that subjecting the defendant to liability for the loss of
consortium is not likely to result in the defendant's bankruptcy, each
state's significant interest in the application of its local law, though
entirely legitimate, is somewhat less intense because of the nature of
the claim. If the court in State A were to ask which litigant would
have been in the better position to have acquired protective insurance, 1 71 the answer almost certainly would be the defendant. Typical
liability insurance would provide protection against the consortium

171. Cf., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583
P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867, (1978): "Plaintiff could have obtained protection
against the occurrence of injury to its corporate vice-president by purchasing keyemployee insurance, certainly a reasonable and foreseeable business expense." Id.

DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:559

claim. Presumably, the "defend and indemnify" obligation of the
liability carrier would extend to this "second" litigation. On the
other hand, the wife might well have found it difficult to acquire
insurance to protect against her loss of consortium. This suggests
that, in the event of an adverse choice-of-law result, the plaintiff
would be imposed upon more than the defendant manufacturer, and
that, in turn, suggests that State A has the more significant interest
in the application of its local law. Assuming the court in State A
would so conclude, it would apply its own law and deny defendant's
motion for summary judgment.
What law would Professor Weintraub's rule apply? Assuming that
the issue goes to "whether plaintiff will be compensated" 7 2 and that
"the product that caused the harm' '1 73 (physical injuries to the
husband and loss of consortium to the plaintiff wife) is "available"' ' 74
in State A, "plaintiff's habitual residence,' ' 75 "through commercial
channels,' ' 76 State A's law would be applied. The rule, therefore,
would produce the same. result as our application of interest analysis.
What happens if we transpose domiciles? Now the plaintiff wife
is domiciled in State B and the defendant is domiciled in State A.
State A remains the forum and continues to utilize interest analysis.
The reason underlying State A's law, which characterizes consortium
actions as independent and which protects the economic integrity of
plaintiff spouses domiciled in that state, would no longer convert
into a significant interest on the part of State A in applying its law.
The reason underlying State B's law, which characterizes consortium
actions as derivative in order to protect the economic integrity of
defendants domiciled in that state, would no longer convert into a
significant interest on the part of State B in applying its law. Interest
analysis, therefore, indicates that neither state has a significant interest in the application of its own law. What's the court to do now?
Having determined that neither state has a significant interest in the
application of its own local law, the court would be free to determine
if either state has a minimal interest in the litigation and, if so, how
that minimal interest would best be served. State A, defendant's
domicile, certainly has a minimal interest in the litigation: protecting
the economic integrity of the defendant. That minimal interest in the
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litigation is best served by the application of State B's law characterizing the consortium action as derivative, and, thus, precluding
the present action. State B, plaintiff's domicile, clearly has a minimal
interest in the litigation: protecting the economic integrity of the
plaintiff. That minimal interest in the litigation is best served by the
application of State A's law characterizing the consortium action as
independent, and, thus, permitting the present action.
What had been a "no interest" case at the higher level of interest,
turns out to be a true conflict at the lower level of interest. Now
the court must determine which state's minimal interest in the litigation is the more significant and apply that local law which best
serves that minimal interest. For the same reason suggested above, I
believe that the State A court would find State B's minimal interest
in protecting the economic integrity of the plaintiff more significant
than State A's minimal interest in protecting the economic integrity
of the defendant. Consequently, the court in State A would apply
that law which best serves State B's interest in protecting the economic
integrity of the State B plaintiff: the local law of State A characterizing the consortium action as independent, thus permitting the action
to proceed.
What result would Professor Weintraub's rule produce? Still assuming that the issue goes to "whether plaintiff will be compensated" 77
and that "the product that caused the harm"1 7 (physical injuries to
the husband and loss of consortium to the plaintiff wife) is available
in State B, "plaintiff's habitual residence,' ' 7 9 "through commercial
channels,"' 8 s0 the rule would apply the law of State B and defendant's
motion for summary judgment would be granted. That result clearly
would serve State A's minimal interest in protecting the economic
integrity of the defendant (and thus would be constitutionally permissible),' 81 but it impliedly asserts that State A's minimal interest in

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. I assume that where each state has a minimal interest in the litigation
which is best served by the application of the other state's local law, the application
of either state's law would be consonant with the full faith and credit clause and
the due process rights of the litigant adversely affected. Where neither state has a
significant interest in the application of its own local law, it would be ludicrous to
assert that either full faith and credit or due process requires that the local law
applied be that of a state having a significant interest in the application of its own
local law. Such a requirement would preclude resolution of the choice-of-law
problem.
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protecting the economic integrity of the defendant is of greater
moment that the minimal interest of State B in protecting the
economic integrity of the plaintiff. That implication is contrary to
the result that our interest analysis produced. Of course, a court
would be free to conclude that State A's minimal interest in the
economic integrity of the defendant (best served by State B's local
law) was of greater significance than State B's minimal interest in
the economic integrity of the plaintiff (best served by State A's local
law). But I wonder how many courts would, in fact, so conclude?
Were the court simply to apply Professor Weintraub's rule (I)(A),
that is the result the court would achieve. I suspect, though, that in
achieving that result, few courts would recognize (absent a conscious
application of interest analysis) that: (1) neither state had a significant
interest in the application of its own local law, (2) each state had a
minimal interest in the litigation, (3) each state's mininal interest in
the litigation was best served by the other state's local law, and (4)
the application of State B's local law through the mechanical application of rule (I)(A) would represent a tacit conclusion that State
A's minimal interest in the economic integrity of the defendant was
of greater significance than State B's minimal interest in the economic
integrity of the plaintiff. I am inclined to think that most courts,
recognizing all of that, would be unlikely to grant defendant's motion
for summary judgment; yet, that is the result that would be achieved
by the application of Professor Weintraub's rule (I)(A). It may be
that judicial comprehension of the relevant factors involved in a
choice-of-law problem and judicial consideration of those factors
before achieving a choice-of-law result are at least as important as
easing the judicial task by providing a rule-facilitated result. And
such judicial comprehension and consideration may produce a result
different from that achieved by the facilitating rule.
Let's restructure our hypothetical again. Plaintiff wife brings her
consortium action contemporaneously with plaintiff husband's personal injury action against defendant manufacturer and the actions
are tried together. Plaintiffs are domiciled in State A, defendant in
State B. The local law of State A characterizes consortium claims as
independent. State B's local law treats such claims as derivative
actions. At trial, defendant introduces evidence that husband had
been contributorily negligent in the manner in which he utilized
defendant's product. Both State A and State B have comparative
negligence statutes and both states hold that the comparative negligence statute is applicable in product liability actions. At the close
of all the evidence, defendant requests that the court instruct the
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jury on comparative negligence and make that instruction applicable
both to the husband's personal injury action and the wife's consortium claim. Plaintiff wife requests an instruction that the husband's
asserted contributory negligence, even if accepted by the jury, and
the comparative negligence statute are inapplicable to wife's consortium claim.
Under the local law of State A, plaintiff wife's requested instruction
would be appropriate. 8 2 Under State B's local law, defendant's
requested instruction would be proper. 83 The State A court uses
interest analysis to resolve the choice-of-law problem.
We have already identified the reason underlying State A's local
law which treats consortium actions as independent: to protect the
economic integrity of spouses domiciled in State A by affording them
a day in court unclouded by any infirmities afflicting the other
spouses' personal injury actions. Since the plaintiff wife is domiciled
in State A, the reason underlying that local law converts into a
significant interest on the part of State A in having its law applied.
We have also identified the reason underlying State B's local law
which treats consortium actions as derivative: to protect the economic
integrity of State B domiciled defendants by affording them an
enhanced opportunity of avoiding or, as in this case, diminishing
liability for consortium claims. 84 Because the defendant is domiciled
in State B, the reason for that state's local law converts into a
significant interest on the part of State B in having its law applied.
The State A court is confronted with a true conflict and under
Hague185 either state's local law could be applied constitutionally.
Still, under interest analysis the court must determine which state's
interest is the more significant and apply the local law of that state.
For the same reason noted earlier, defendant would have been in a
better position to have acquired protective insurance, the court would
conclude that State A has the more significant interest, therefore, its
local law would be applied. Consequently, the court would reject the
defendant's requested instruction and utilize the instruction requested

182. Macon v. Seaward Construction Co., supra note 157; Brann v. Exeter
Clinic, Inc., supra note 170; Feltch v. General Rental Co., supra note 170.
183. Eggert v. Working, supra note 168; Scattaregia v. Shin Shen Wu, supra
note 168.
184. Here, unlike the earlier hypothetical, there is no concern about duplicative
litigation expenses since the basic personal injury action and the consortium action
were brought and tried together.
185. Hague, 449 U.S. 302. See supra note 30.
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by the plaintiff. For the same reason noted above, Professor Weintraub's rule would achieve the same result and apply the local law
86
of State A, "plaintiff's habitual residence."'
Now let's transpose domiciles. Plaintiffs are domiciled in State B
and defendant is domiciled in State A. As noted earlier, in those
circumstances, neither state would have a significant interest in the
application of its own local law. State A's interest in protecting the
economic integrity of plaintiff spouses domiciled in that state would
not convert and State B's interest in protecting the economic integrity
of its defendant domiciliaries would not convert. Having concluded
that neither state has a significant interest in the application of its
own local law, the court would be free to inquire as to whether
either state has a minimal interest in the litigation and, if so, how
that minimal interest would best be served. Once again, each state
would have such a minimal interest in the litigation arising out of
the domicile of one of the litigants in that state and, once again,
State A's minimal interest in the economic integrity of the State A
domiciled defendant would best be served by the local law of State
B which treats consortium claims as derivative and State B's minimal
interest in the economic integrity of the plaintiff wife domiciled in
State B would best be served by the local law of State A which
characterizes consortium actions as. independent. At that lower level
of interests, the case presents a true conflict. Now, the State A court
must determine which state's minimal interest in the litigation is the
more significant and apply that local law which best serves that
interest. For the same reason noted above, I believe the court would
find State B's minimal interest in protecting the economic integrity
of the plaintiff wife to be the more significant and, for that reason,
would apply the local law of State A which characterizes consortium
actions as independent. Consequently, the court would deny defendant's requested instruction.
How about Professor Weintraub's rule? Since the issue goes to
the "extent of compensation for actual damages"'' 8 7 (whether wife's
recovery should be diminished by husband's contributory negligence),
and assuming that defendant's product is available in "plaintiff's
' 89
habitual residence"' 8 8 (State B) "through commercial channels,'

186.
187.
188.
189.

Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the rule would apply the local law of State B, "plaintiff's habitual
residence,"' 9 and the defendant's requested instruction would be
read to the jury. As noted earlier, utilization of that rule by the
court would not only produce a result different from that which we
achieved through interest analysis; it would, as well, obfuscate the
legal conclusions that: (1) neither state had a significant interest in
the application of its own local law, (2) each state had a minimal
interest in the litigation, and (3) each state's minimal interest in the
litigation was best served by the other state's local law. It may be
worth noting as well that Professor Weintraub's rule, here and earlier
on, applies the local law of plaintiff's domicile irrespective of where
plaintiff is domiciled, State A or State B, and irrespective of whether
that choice-of-law result favors or disfavors the plaintiff's cause.
That result suggests that the fact-specific nature of Professor Weintraub's rule can produce anomalous results when the facts upon
which the rule depends have little relevancy to the facts, laws,
underlying reasons, and interests of a particular case.

IX.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Plaintiff, a domiciliary of State A, sues defendant, domiciled in
State B, to recover compensatory and punitive damages as a result
of injuries he sustained as a result of his use of defendant's product.
Plaintiff purchased the product in State B, carried the product (which
is readily portable) back to State A, and was injured by the product
in State A. The action is brought in State A, where defendant is

subject to jurisdiction. Under the circumstances of the case, the local
law of State A would permit recovery of punitive damages; however,
the local law of State B would preclude recovery of punitive damages.
Relying on the local law of State B, the defendant moves for summary
judgment with regard to punitive damages. Plaintiff, asserting the

applicability of State A's local law, opposes the motion. The court
in State A employs interest analysis.
The first matter to be determined by the court is the reason

underlying each state's local law. Presumably, State A's local law
permitting punitive damages exists to deter the defendant and others
similarly situated from engaging in such conduct. But why does State

A wish to accomplish that deterrent effect? I suppose there are a
couple of reasons. One would be simply because State A finds the

190.

Id.
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conduct to be inherently outrageous. Another would be State A's
desire to assure that State A domiciliaries are not subjected to injuries
occasioned by such conduct. To the extent that State A's concern
goes to the defendant's inherently outrageous conduct, perhaps that
concern would not convert into a significant interest on the part of
State A in having its local law apply. After all, defendant's conduct
occurred exclusively in State B. However, State A's concern for the
safety of its domiciliaries would seem to convert into a significant
interest on the part of State A in having its local law applied. After
all, the victim is domiciled in State A and his injuries were sustained
there. What about the reasons underlying State B's local law precluding punitive damages? Presumably, that law exists because State
B does not view such conduct as sufficiently outrageous to justify
amercing the defendant. In other words, State B's local law exists
to protect the economic integrity of defendants domiciled in that
state. Since the defendant in our hypothetical is domiciled in State
B, he falls precisely within the class intended to be protected.
Consequently, State B has a significant interest in the application of
its local law. Interest analysis indicates a true conflict: each state has
a significant interest in the application of its own local law. In those
circumstances, the application of either state's local law would be
9
constitutionally permissible under Hague.' '
The final step of the court's interest analysis would be to determine
which state has the more significant interest in the application of its
own local law. We have repeatedly suggested that a state's desire to
regulate conduct would convert into a significant interest on the part
of that state in having its local law applied if the conduct occurred
in that state, or the immediate consequences of the conduct occurred
there, or the ongoing consequences of the conduct would be felt
there. Moreover, we have concluded that such a conduct regulating
concern, aimed at protecting and preserving human life, would be
of greater significance than another state's admittedly legitimate
interest in protecting the economic integrity of its domiciled defendants. I think that same reasoning applies, perhaps a fortiori, where
the conduct to be regulated or prevented is so outrageous in the
state's view as to justify the imposition of punitive damages as a
means of protecting its domiciliaries from injuries occasioned by such
conduct. If the court in State A acquiesced in that conclusion, it

191.

Hague, 449 U.S. 302. See supra note 30.
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would apply its own local law and deny defendant's motion for
summary judgment with regard to punitive damages.
Would that result come as such an outrageous surprise to the
defendant as to violate its due process rights? I think not. Although
the defendant's conduct occurred in State B, the readily portable
nature of its product should have made it reasonably foreseeable that
the product, even though acquired in State B, might be carried into
another state and there cause injury to a domiciliary of that state.
Would such a result be unfair to defendant? I don't think so. If the
very nature of defendant's product makes it reasonably foreseeable
that the product, though acquired in State B, may be carried into
another state and there injure the user, applying the local law of
that other state, even with regard to punitive damages, would hardly
seem unfair to the defendant.
What result would Professor Weintraub's rule produce? Rule (II)
provides:
On issues affecting the availability and measurement of punitive damages, the plaintiff may elect the law of any of the places designated
in rule (I)(C).192
Rule (I)(C), in turn, provides:
If the law of plaintiff's habitual residence is not applied under rules
(I)(A) or (I)(B), the plaintiff may elect the law of any of the following
places:
1. the defendant's principal place of business;
2. the place where the product was acquired if the defendant
should have foreseen its availability there through commercial
channels;
3. the place where the defendant manufactured, designed, or
maintained the product or any of its component parts.'
This creates a small problem of interpretation. Does rule (Ii)'s
reference to the law that the plaintiff may elect pursuant to rule
(I)(C) refer to (1) the law of plaintiff's habitual residence as well as
the law of the places identified in rule (I)(C) 1, 2, and 3, or (2) does
it refer only to the law of the places identified in rule (I)(C) 1, 2,
and 3? Professor Weintraub's text seems to provide an easy answer
to the problem. He wrote:

192.
193.

Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
Id. at 507.
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Even if the plaintiff's state provides the most generous compensation
and it is fair to the defendant to be exposed to this law, it is not
necessarily desirable to apply that law to punitive damages. A number
of courts have held that plaintiff's residence is interested in the
adequacy of recovery for actual damages, but that the award of
punitive damages should be left to jurisdictions where the defendant
has acted in a manner sufficiently outrageous to warrant such damages.
It is those jurisdictions that should decide whether defendant's conduct
should be punished and deterred.'9
Apparently, rule (II)'s reference to the law that the plaintiff may

elect under rule (I)(C) (at least in our hypothetical) is intended to be
limited to:
1. the defendant's principal place of business;
2. the place where the product was acquired if the defendant should
have foreseen its availability there through commercial channels; [or]
3. the place where the defendant manufactured, designed, or maintained the product or any of its component parts.1 95
In our hypothetical, therefore, plaintiff would be left to "elect" the
law of State B, under which punitive damages are precluded. Obviously, plaintiff would have no interest in electing that law. This
creates a small problem for the court. If "elect" is read as permissive
and plaintiff chooses not to elect the law of State B, is the rule
simply inapplicable to our hypothetical? Or is "elect" to be given a
restrictive reading: the law of State B must be applied? To avoid the
rule's inapplicability to this basic choice-of-law problem involving
punitive damages, let's indulge in the assumption that the restrictive
reading is intended.196 Thus, under Professor Weintraub's rule, the
court would apply the local law of State B precluding punitive
damages and grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. Why?
The answer, of course, appears in that excerpt from Professor
Weintraub's text set forth above. In his view, it would not be
"desirable"' ' 97 to apply State A's local law permitting punitive damages; rather, defendant's vulnerability to punitive damages should be

194. Id. (italics added).
195. Id. at 508.
196. I have assumed that the restrictive reading is intended for two reasons.
First, as noted in the text, that reading permits us to avoid the conclusion that the
rule is inapplicable to the hypothetical. Second, here, unlike the first hypothetical
considered in this article, see supra text at note 38, Professor Weintraub's rule does
not provide for consecutive alternative elections. Rather, the rule provides for only
one election. That suggests to me that the one election is intended to provide a
required result.
197. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
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determined by the local law of the state "where the defendant has
acted."' 198 It seems to me, as reflected in our interest analysis, that
defendant's outrageous conduct cannot rationally be separated entirely from the consequences of that conduct. Moreover, to determine
the availability of punitive damages pursuant to the local law of the
state where defendant acted when that state precludes punitive damages (as in our hypothetical), seems to imply a certain tolerance of
such conduct by that state. In reality, that state through its local law
has said no more than that it does not view such conduct as being
sufficiently outrageous to justify the imposition of punitive damages.
If that bespeaks toleration, it does so in the lowest possible sense of
that word. Combining the lowest level of toleration with the practical
reality that outrageous conduct and its consequences cannot be
entirely dissociated suggests that the result achieved through interest
analysis may be preferable to the result achieved by Professor Weintraub's rule.
Let's refashion our hypothetical. Plaintiff, domiciled in State A,
brings a product liability action against two defendants, one domiciled
in State B and the other domiciled in State C. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages from both defendants. Plaintiff
acquired the product in State B, carried the readily portable product
back to State A, and there was injured by the product. The State B
defendant manufactured the product in State B. The State C defendant manufactured a component part of the product in State C. The
action is brought in State A. Both defendants have been sued in
earlier actions arising from use of similar products and compensatory
and punitive damages have been awarded against both defendants.
The local law of State A would permit plaintiff to recover punitive
damages and the earlier awards for punitive damages imposed on
the defendants would be irrelevant and inadmissible.199 Although the
local law of State B generally allows punitive damages in such actions,
such damages would be precluded in this case because of the previous
judgments imposing such damages. 200 The local law of State C would
permit an award of punitive damages, but would also permit the

198.

Id.

199. For judicial discussions of the approaches reflected in the local laws of
State A, State B, and State C in our hypothetical, see Fischer v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (1986); Celotex Corp v. Pickett, 459 So.2d 375
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d

Cir. 1967).
200. See supra note 199.
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defendant, if it wished, to present evidence of the prior punitive
damage awards as a means of diminishing the punitive damages in
this case. 20' Relying on the local law of State B, the State B defendant
moves for summary judgment with regard to punitive damages.
Relying on the local law of State C, the State C defendant files a
motion in limine seeking a ruling that evidence of prior punitive
damages awarded against it be received in evidence. Plaintiff, relying
on the local law of State A, opposes both motions. The State A
court uses interest analysis.
Let's begin with the choice-of-law issue between plaintiff and the
State B defendant. Presumably, State A permits punitive damages
without regard to the prior judgments because (1) State A finds the
alleged conduct of the defendant to be inherently outrageous, and
(2) State A wants to deter such conduct to assure that State A
domiciliaries are not subject to injuries by such conduct. Assuming
that the defendant's conduct occurred exclusively in State B, the first
reason might not convert into a significant interest on the part of
State A in having its local law applied. However, State A's other
concern, that its domiciliaries should not be subjected to injuries
occasioned by such outrageous conduct, would seem to convert into
a significant interest on the part of State A .in having its local law
applied. After all, the victim is domiciled in State A and was there
injured by the product.
State B's local law which would preclude the award of punitive
damages in light of the prior judgments for punitive damages, exists
to protect State B domiciled defendants from "overkill." Put another
way, State B wishes to protect the economic integrity of its domiciled
defendants by precluding "duplicative" awards of punitive damages
which, in that state's view, threaten economic integrity and have a
diminished deterrent effect. Since the defendant is domiciled in State
B, it falls precisely within the class intended to be so protected by
that state's law. Thus,. State B would have a significant interest in
the application of its local law. Interest analysis indicates a true
conflict.
I am inclined to think that the court would find State A's interest
in the application of its local law to be the more significant interest.

201. Obviously, defense counsel would be confronted with a tactical decision.
While the prior awards of punitive damages could induce the jury to award
diminished punitive damages in the present case, those same prior awards could
facilitate a jury finding that punitive damages in some amount were appropriate in
the present case.
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In our earlier hypothetical dealing with punitive damages, we concluded that a state's interest in deterring conduct for the purpose of
protecting and preserving human life would be of greater moment
than a competing state's interest in protecting the economic integrity
of its domiciled defendants. I believe that same conclusion would be
applicable here. Consequently, I believe that the court would apply
State A's local law and deny the defendant's motion for summary
judgment with regard to the requested punitive damages.
How about the other defendant's request that it be permitted to
introduce evidence of the prior awards of punitive damages? State
A's law would not permit such evidence aimed at diminishing punitive
damages. We have already identified the reasons underlying State
A's law and concluded that one of those reasons, deterring outrageous
conduct for the purpose of assuring that its domiciliaries are not
subjected to injuries occasioned by such conduct, would convert into
a significant interest on the part of State A in having its local law
applied. State C's law, however, would permit the receipt of such
evidence for the purpose of diminishing punitive damages in the
present action.
I suppose the State A court could label this issue "merely evidentiary" and automatically apply its own law. However, I think it
would be far preferable for the court to determine whether there is
a "substantive" policy reason underlying State C's law and, if there
is, to treat the issue as a choice-of-law problem. Apparently, the
reason underlying State C's local law is to protect the economic
integrity of its domiciled defendants by affording them this opportunity to diminish punitive damages. Since the defendant is within
that protected class, State C would have a significant interest in the
application of its local law. This suggests that the State A court
should treat this matter as a choice-of-law problem and resolve it
through interest analysis. Once again, I am inclined to believe that
the forum would find State A's interest in protecting and preserving
human life to be of greater significance that State C's admittedly
legitimate interest in protecting the economic integrity of its domiciled
defendant.
But suppose the defendant argues that the application of State C's
local law would impair State A's interest less than the application of
State A's local law would impair State C's interest. If State C's law
is applied and the defendant is given the opportunity to present
evidence of the prior awards of punitive damages, plaintiff may still
recover some punitive damages, albeit in a diminished amount. On
the other hand, if State A's law is applied, such evidence will be
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excluded and defendant will have no such opportunity to diminish
the amount of punitive damages. How should the court react to such
an argument? Although I am generally sympathetic to such a comparative impairment approach, I think it is insufficient to diminish
an interest in protecting and preserving human life to a level less
significant than an interest in protecting a defendant's economic
integrity. Consequently, I believe the court would (and should) apply
State A's local law and exclude the defendant's offered evidence of
prior judgments of punitive damages.
How would Professor Weintraub's rule resolve each of these
choice-of-law problems? The first issue as between State A and State
B goes to "the availability . . . of punitive damages. ' 20 2 Under rule
(II), therefore, "the plaintiff may elect the law of any of the places
designated in rule (I)(C):" 203
1. the defendant's principal place of business;
2. the place where the product was acquired if the defendant should
have foreseen its availability there through commercial channels; [or]
3. the place where the defendant manufactured, designed, or maintained the product or any of its component parts. 204
In our hypothetical, all three of those choices would lead to the
application of the local law of State B and, therefore, defendant's
motion for summary judgment with regard to punitive damages would
25
be granted.
With regard to the second issue as between State A and State C,
it goes to "the... measurement of punitive damages." 2° Once more,
rule (II) would permit the plaintiff to elect the law of any of the
places designated in rule (I)(C). The first place ("defendant's principal
place of business")

20 7

and the third place (where the State C "defen-

dant manufactured, designed, or maintained the product or any of
its component parts") 20

8

would both point to the local law of State

C. The second place ("where the product was acquired if the defendant should have foreseen its availability there through commercial
channels")

2

9

0

would point to the local law of State B. Since State

202. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. I am still assuming that the election set forth in the rule produces a
required result. See supra note 196.
206. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 508.
207. Id.
208.

Id.

209. Id.
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B's local law would preclude punitive damages entirely, the plaintiff
presumably would opt for the local law of State C210 and the State
C defendant's motion to present evidence of the prior judgments of
punitive damages would be granted.
In both instances, Professor Weintraub's rule produces a result
different from that which we achieved through interest analysis. In
both instances, that different result seems to be the product of
' 2
Professor Weintraub's conclusion that it would not be "desirable "
to determine choice-of-law issues going to punitive damages pursuant
to the local law of plaintiff's domicile state. Rather, Professor
Weintraub prefers to have such issues resolved by the local law of
the state "where the defendant has acted. ' 212 As noted with regard
to our first hypothetical involving punitive damages, the sharp distinction between where the defendant acted and where the consequences of that action will be felt seems painfully artificial. I believe
that outrageous conduct and its consequences cannot be so neatly
dissociated.
Professor Weintraub's resolution of the choice-of-law problem as
between the plaintiff and the second defendant poses an additional
problem: his rule would permit the plaintiff to select the local law
of either State B or State C. Although we have noted that the
plaintiff is likely to opt for State C's less disadvantageous law, we
should consider the general propriety of the alternative election. State
B's local law, available under Professor Weintraub's rule, would
preclude punitive damages entirely in the circumstances of our hypothetical. We have concluded that the reason for that local law is
to protect the economic integrity of defendants domiciled in State
B. Our second defendant was domiciled in State C, not State B.
This would suggest that State B would have no significant interest
in the application of its local law with regard to the second defendant.
By making State B's local law available, Professor Weintraub's rule
produces a result which is, in addition to being different from the
result we achieved through interest analysis, arguably constitutionally
suspect under Hague.
X.

CONCLUSION

In applying Professor Weintraub's rule to the series of hypotheticals considered, we have produced a variety of results. In some

210. See supra note 200.
211. Weintraub, supra note 3, at 507.
212. Id.
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instances, the rule simply did not provide an answer. In some
instances, the rule provided the same result as did interest analysis.
In other instances, the rule provided a result which was apparently
inconsistent with the result suggested by interest analysis and which
was constitutionally suspect. In some cases, interest analysis was
essential to determine whether the rule or its caveat was intended to
be applicable. In other cases, even interest analysis did not provide
a conclusive answer as to whether the rule or its caveat should apply.
Given this variety of results, it seems to me that Professor Weintraub's rule does little to improve the choice-of-law process in product
liability actions. Worse, in some cases, it may obscure the factors to
which a court confronted with such choice-of-law problems should
be sensitive.
Do I have a better "magic" rule? No. Rather, I believe that a
court, aided by counsel, is likely to achieve appropriate results in
resolving choice-of-law problems in product liability actions by utilizing interest analysis. Indeed, the combined efforts of court and
counsel are likely to produce far better results than those achieved
by my own interest analysis. The sort of synthesis provided by
Professor Weintraub's rule, as fact specific as the rule is, tends more
to obfuscate than to illuminate (1) the reasons underlying each state's
local law, (2) whether or not those reasons convert into significant
interests on the part of each of the states, (3) when a state, having
no significant interest in the application of its own local law, may
have a minimal interest in the litigation best served by the other
state's local law, and (4) which state's local law should be applied
and why. I applaud Professor Weintraub's effort to facilitate the
choice-of-law process in product liability actions, but I cannot acquiesce in the results of that effort. I believe that courts and counsel
should bear in mind a few simple truisms. First, factual complexity
does not necessarily breed complex choice-of-law problems. If multiple states have contacts with the operative facts of a particular case,
but the local laws of those states are similar, the factual complexity
will not generate choice-of-law complexities. Second, even if the local
laws of some of those states do differ, interest analysis may demonstrate that not all of those states having disparate local laws have
significant interests in the application of their respective laws. Third,
where the states having different local laws do have significant
interests in the application of their laws, the court, aided by counsel's
efforts, does possess the capacity to resolve those choice-of-law
problems rationally through interest analysis. In the context of choiceof-law problems in product liability actions, I believe that analysis
illuminates and synthesis obfuscates.

